The last exhibition of the 20th century [Lumbung 1 (documenta 15)]

Response to Charles Esche, “The First Exhibition of the Twenty-First Century—Lumbung 1 (Documenta Fifteen), What Happened, and What It Might Mean Two Years On.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Art 24, no. 1

Large-scale international exhibitions flourished in the nineteen-nineties, as Internet technologies underwritten by the Californian Ideology promised a pathway out of state-managed cultural agonisms of the Cold War era, enabling truly global reach for capitalist modes of content circulation. The oligarchal platforms that would turn dissensus into a business model and replace democracy with telecracy[1] were yet to be imagined, and biennialist expansion did not then threaten to thwart indie self-organisation. Ade Darmawan, in a conversation with Nuraini Juliastuti on ‘horizontal organisation’ published in 2012, identified ruangrupa as ‘part of the 1990s generation, which greatly admires that of the 60s’[2], noting their attraction to graphic designer David Carson’s work for Raygun magazine, which is perhaps the most nineties thing ever: a mid-nineties interview with Carson was one of my own first publications for an artworld periodical.

The parallel proliferation of artist-led organisation through the nineties can be situated in Marina Vishmidt’s analysis of the speculative mode of production, with art finding a role in capitalism as an “aperture in use”, paving the way for a speculative process of “imaginary subsumption” where as-yet uncodified symbolic relations from near and far could be extracted and circulated in a neoliberal content economy, positing artistic work as the apotheosis of creative flexible labour[3]. The “artist-run initiative” would begin to find its role among the programming of state-backed institutions, risk-managed by curatoriality’s expanding author-function. But we can perhaps see more clearly today that nineties contemporary art’s valorisation of alternatives and diversity was fundamentally perched atop an organisational logic of Western imperialism, as documenta 15 illustrated.

The Western concept of ‘cultural development’ as an ideology of freedom and autonomy against an ‘under-developed’ cultural formation on the other side of the civilisational colour line is the historical rationale for cultural funding of both state and market in the West. In the creative industries era, cultural development could technocratically incorporate tourism and real estate economies to help fuel the merry-go-round of serial placemaking in a globalised biennale culture. Perhaps in the passionate retrospect Esche gives us – appropriately gloomier than the more feisty original talk — we can sense how ruangrupa were doomed to fail in their impossible attempt to offer Germany lumbung as a pluralised, community-based articulation of bildung (education/formation). ruangrupa’s selective inattention to the natural boundary setting of liberal authorial responsibilisation in Europe turned out to be indigestible, as Europe would not accept their collective predication of subjectivity as a supplement to its individualist Christian-heritage secularism. Lumbung 1 revealed how the supposedly cosmopolitan ideologies of Western contemporary art were unable to divest from their own long-held neo-colonial birthright to be the taxonomists of global culture, from staging World’s Fairs in the nineteenth century to the contemporary biennial as a kind of aesthetic petting zoo. Diversifying the curatorial wardens of this carceral complex helped bolster the democratic optics of contemporary art, but only as long as the staged decolonial aspirations left the sensibilities of those at the helm of the art-finance machine fundamentally untroubled.

This imperialist conception of non-Western non-Enlightenment also took shape among those in the critical wings of the contemporary art egology. We should remember Hito Steyerl’s spectacular display of non-solidarity in withdrawing from the exhibition, stating that they ‘have no faith in the [documenta] organization’s ability to mediate and translate complexity’[4], avoiding any direct critique of the curatorial approach but more or less saying to ruangrupa: not managerial, diligent or compliant enough. Or Sven Lütticken, who characterised ruangrupa’s method as ‘mind-boggling, bumbling’[5] because of its decentralisation and effacement of singularly-held authorial responsibility. They both inhabit the developmentalist imaginary, attributing to ruangrupa an impairment of comprehension stemming from ruangrupa’s faith in collective autonomy explicitly against European fantasies of moral grace that animate the “global” artistic mindset.

As Esche alludes to, the deliberate obfuscation of Germany’s colonial history has resulted in a memory culture that is fuelled by moves to innocence that are all too familiar here in the settler colony[6]. And now the “narcissistic anti-anti semitism”[7] provoked into response by Lumbung 1 has more devastating consequences outside the art world as the West funds and arms a genocidal occupation in Gaza. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak formalised the colonial mindset in the psychoanalytic concept of foreclosure[8]: a fundamental signifier (the colonised) associated with negative feeling is expelled from the coloniser’s symbolic repertoire, becoming unspeakable, leaving a specific negative space in the psychic formation that must be constantly shuttled around but can never be allowed a mode of direct address, lest the bad feeling associated with the expelled signifier return. If the psychic armature of denial was lowered to allow recognition of the signifier (in this case, the racist nature of the settler-colonial solution to Europe’s ‘Jewish Question’ in Palestine) the integrity of the subjectivity built around the psychic expulsion (Western anti anti-semitism as atonement) would collapse. For Lacan, psychosis — denial of reality — is the consequence of foreclosure.  The Western psychosis around Palestine lays bare the corrupt nature of the West’s colonial claim as the natural stage for the world’s cultures. In its gestures toward multicultural pluralism, the commissioning of ruangrupa for Lumbung 1 was perhaps the last gasp of the West’s nineties promise. No large European exhibition will delegate this level of curatorial autonomy outside Western logics of managerialism again: it was the last exhibition of the twentieth century.


[1] Bernard Stiegler, “Telecracy Against Democracy,” Cultural Politics 6, no. 2 (July 1, 2010): 171–80.

[2] Nuraini Juliastuti, “Ruangrupa: A Conversation on Horizontal Organisation,” Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry 30 (2012): 125.

[3] Marina Vishmidt, Speculation as a Mode of Production: Forms of Value Subjectivity in Art and Capital, vol. 176, Historical Materialism (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 220–224.

[4] Taylor Dafoe, “Artist Hito Steyerl Has Pulled Her Work From Documenta, Saying She Has ‘No Faith’ in Organizers Ability to Address Antisemitism Accusations,” Artnet, July 8, 2022, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/hito-steyerl-pulls-out-documenta-2144265.

[5]Sven Lütticken, “From Farce to Tragedy,” Sven Lütticken: Texts and Projects (blog), June 21, 2022, https://svenlutticken.org/2022/06/21/from-farce-to-tragedy/.

[6] Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.

[7] Daniel Denvir, “The German Question W/ Emily Dische-Becker,” Podcast,The Dig Radio, January 31, 2024, https://thedigradio.com/podcast/the-german-question-w-emily-dische-becker/.

[8] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4–6.

Ethics and the Infratructure of Artistic Research: Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument

Butt, Danny. “Ethics and the Infrastructure of Artistic Research: Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument.” In The Meeting of Aesthetics and Ethics in the Academy: Challenges for Creative Practice Researchers in Higher Education, edited by Barbara Bolt and Kate MacNeill, 25–37. London: Routledge, 2020. [Accepted version]

The relationship between the political and the ethical is one of the timeless questions of political aesthetics, and the historical tension between the two is clearly echoed in attempts to manage the ethics of artistic research today, whether they occur within the academy or institutions commissioning and presenting artistic work. In the Western tradition, through colonial expansion the modern nation state transforms its model of governance from one based on kinship to one based on territory. With this transition comes a mode of citizenship based on the human subject who is ruled by an authority that governs the city or polis, this authority resting in an infrastructure we call political. Actual participation in the governance of the city is, however, reserved for the governing representatives who solicit expert input, or more commonly, financial investment, which they use to justify their decisions on behalf of the polis. The nation-state’s political structures manage lands and the production of subjects that inhabit them, but at such a scale the state is less able to intervene directly in the relationships between citizens, except through the passing of laws that hold wrongdoers to account after the fact (even if actual policing has never adhered to the juridical framework). In this democratic mode, therefore, daily behaviours are said to reside in the sphere of the ethical, where conduct is governed by extra-legal relations of responsibility between citizens.

 In modern terms, according to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1995: 70), ‘The ethical is not a problem of knowledge but a problem of relation’ or, as she later revises, ethics are ‘a problem of relation before they are a task of knowledge’ (Spivak, 2004: 531). Ethics in this mode is not conceived as ‘doing the right thing’ in a teachable way: this formulation sees ‘ethics training’ as oxymoronic. Instead, ethics is understood as ‘openness toward the imagined agency of the other’ (Spivak, 2004: 531), an openness that holds the essential calculation of democracy: the ability to see the other as potentially substitutable for oneself. However, we must also attend to the singular difference of the other so our imagined substitutability does not run roughshod over what makes the other both individual and different from us. Between this singularity of ethics and the massification of politics lies an aporia that Spivak (2004: 531) suggests is ‘disclosed only in its one-way crossing’, with no neutral place to understand it without doing it. The crossing of the political via the ethical — the attempt to make the world adequate to one’s own values through one’s relationships — is each citizen’s unique task.

What is the implication of this task for artistic research? At the very least, it questions the university’s protocols for managing institutional research, as the ethical in Spivak’s frame consists in how we handle the political dynamics inherent in our institutional location as university researchers. This is a theme which has been explored at length in critical accounts of qualitative research methods. Cannella and Lincoln (2007: 318) note that our desire to be ‘good’ and ethical researchers cannot redeem our work while the institution’s ethical regulatory systems are more concerned with protection against reduction of funding, degradation of research prestige, and associated legal and liability issues, rather than the actual well-being of communities. While regulatory systems operate ‘on behalf of’ the public interest, and those of us who work in them take such responsibilities, it is hard to take these claims for the system at face value when communities are almost never involved in decision-making or review mechanisms. In a related argument, scholars Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2013) have written on the potential of ‘refusing research’, noting that ‘the ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling – its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know and to defend its violations in the name of “good science”’ (Tuck and Yang, 2013: 424). The professionalising mechanisms of ‘best practices’ then become barriers to genuine ethical engagement with communities toward just outcomes that exceed their role as ‘stakeholders’. Cannella and Lincoln (2007: 318) propose instead that:

Attention must be given to (a) new forms of imperialism as exhibited in contemporary global hypercapitalism – that construct research and ethics as related to market philosophies; (b) the multiple life positions, locations, and voices of those who have been research participants and created as the Other historically, whether indigenous people, poor women, prisoners, children, or anyone who has been ‘represented’ through some form of research; (c) academia itself and the ethical research perspectives and practices of those who conduct research and train others in those practices; and (d) the contemporary legislative, policy, and enforcement environment that would impose particular behaviours a priori on individual researchers.

This trenchant critique echoes that of Māori researcher Maui Hudson (2009: 127) who points to two levels of ‘ethicality’ in research infrastructure: an ‘internal ethicality’ focused on respect, harm minimisation, compensation and concern; and an ‘external ethicality’ of justice, community engagement and cultural responsibility. The institution seeks to manage the ‘internal ethicality’ of the researcher through ethics review in advance of any engagement between researcher and community, but the ‘external ethicality’ is where the true political impact of research is to be found. Thus, the role of the critical and ethical researcher will be to continually seek and disrupt those locations where bureaucratic machinery appropriates or subjugates the specific and situated life experience of researchers and communities affected by research. Barbara Bolt (2015: 63) points to a distinctive role for artists in exploring these questions as ‘artistic researchers graduate into the artworld, and in that world it is the community and not the ethics committee that will be the arbiter of efficacy and the ethics of the work’. This public accountability would also affect any academic seeking to consider ‘impact’ outside of internally validated mechanisms of the university.

However, to understand how we can engage ethically outside of the university, we firstly need to know exactly how we are interpellated into the university. This is a difficult process when the university appears to us as scholars much like a polluted waterway might appear to resident fish, surrounding and sustaining us in whichever imperfect fashion, regardless of any independent assessment of its value or impact. Rather than asking how we can be more ethical in our practice, we can perhaps figure external ethicality by borrowing from Lisa Weems and Elizabeth Ellsworth (2006: 1103) to ask, ‘Who does ethics think you are?’ This impossible question leads us away from ethical ‘decision-making’ to consider the assumptions of the subjective habits that are normalised in academic infrastructures, assumptions that the ethical encounter inevitably ruptures.

Infrastructure, institutional critique and reflexive institutionalisation

According to the critic Benjamin Buchloh (1990: 105-143), since Duchamp the matter of art as a linguistic convention has become joined with a conception of art as ‘both a legal contract and an institutional discourse (a discourse of power rather than taste)’. The critic and curator Marion von Osten (2010: 69) thus proposes an analysis of exhibitions in general that ‘would need to be read beyond their representational intention or composition of narratives’, including a discussion on ‘how, why and by whom they have been produced, under which conditions and, most importantly, what they finally enable’. Andrea Fraser (2006: 88). has described the professional field of art as undergoing changes in the ‘structure, organisation, and orientation of institutions’, including a ‘growing emphasis on income-producing activities.’ For the critic Isabelle Graw, rather than accepting ‘Institutional Critique’ as a contained history, we must note that the institution can no longer be delimited, and it ‘nowadays consists of a global art industry producing visuality and meaning, with people like us [the “independent” arts professional] more or less “institutionalized” within it’ (Ai et al. 2008: 303). Tom Holert (2012: 31) asks the question this way: ‘What if the “citizenship” of artists and art communities is proven less by their conforming to “civic interests” and “worldly attention” than by their questioning and ultimately attacking the very complicity between art and higher education, research administration, galleries, museums, biennials, government, and social utility? In short, is there an art imaginable that disrupts and splits reality, and makes incompatible claims with regard to what is communally shared?’ We have moved a long way here from quiet contemplation in the ethical encounter with art as a preparation for politics. Instead, the art of institutional critique asks us to consider the political as happening immediately and immanently within our own situation (Butt, 2017).

Fraser’s (2006) account of the generic capitalist forces that are turning the art industry into just another business seem to echo the erosion of academic autonomy through the transformation of the university’s business practices under neoliberalism. Elsewhere, I have outlined science’s limitations as a model for artistic research through its displacement of the independent critical voice and thus the suppression of an ethic of care (see Butt, 2016). However, science is no longer the dominant enterprise in the university as it was at the beginning of the artistic research debates: the major field of study for postgraduate students today is business and commerce, constituting a full quarter of Australian enrolments, compared to fewer than ten percent for the natural and physical sciences (ABS, 2005). This shift in university enrolments reflects the times, for as the critic Marina Vishmidt (2010) has noted, education ‘has become one of the most highly commodified and instrumentalised sectors worldwide and debt slavery and ‘employability’ are the real products of most universities’. Students, it seems, are ultimately seeking education in the financial principles that strictly govern their debt-laden futures in a way that was not the case for those a generation earlier.

Whether education in business as a field of academic study delivers on its promise to students is neither here nor there for artistic researchers, who usually operate in a different faculty. Our own work is challenged by finance not as a topic, but as a dominant governing ratio of the university’s internal organisation. Methodological distinctions between the arts, sciences, and commerce are rendered moot through the evisceration of discipline-specific research infrastructure and the occupation of university research by a new generic set of operations under the ever-expanding category of ‘overhead’: risk management; commercialisation; construction and property services; intellectual property; contract management; security; insurance; service-oriented architectures; organisational reviews; stakeholder management; monitoring and compliance; occupational health and safety; space utilisation charges; governance; business intelligence; and portfolio management to name but a few. These domains of practice will be familiar to any university administrator.1

There is little of interest to say about the growth of these new domains in the university, except that they are impervious to academic knowledge of the type generated in research. Foucault’s conception of disciplinary society involved an institutional accretion of power/knowledge (puissance/connaissance) that reflexively incorporates the sub-disciplinary forces of pouvoir/savoir (Spivak, 1993: 43). The university, as the self-consciously disciplinary institution, saw its role as intellectually understanding new knowledges emerging in the world, in turn bringing about new university disciplines (engineering, gender studies, or contemporary art, for example). Today, the corporate form that Clark Kerr (1963) called the ‘multiversity’ deliberately insulates itself from its own disciplinary expertise. To take one example, my own university’s high-profile restructuring of professional staffing was not designed or run by our highly-ranked business faculty with their well-promoted intellectual leadership in strategy and change management, but instead by a global consulting firm.2 Similarly, universities do not generally seek to implement the innovative designs of its design school; the information technology of its IT faculty; or most of all, the research-based pedagogy of its education professors, outsourced to casuals and assessed by student satisfaction metrics.

These forces rationalising and reformatting university operations can be filed under the generic description of infrastructure. Angela Mitropolous (2012) articulated infrastructure’s binding of the political to the ethical when she defined infrastructure as ‘an answer to the question of movement and relation’. Here, infrastructure is what comes to program relationalities, and her formulation of infrastructure as an ‘answer’ also captures the important point that all infrastructure is also a statement, an assertion, a performance. Increasingly, infrastructure is discussed as a platform (Butt, McQuire and Papastergiadis, 2016). The multilayered life for platform infrastructure is captured in Brian Larkin’s (2013: 329) definitions as ‘objects that create the grounds on which other objects operate’, as ‘things and also the relation between things’. 

Infrastructure as a genre written through global capitalism is somewhat of a challenge for creative researchers, who usually seek to customise, if not autonomously develop, their infrastructure in each artistic situation. How then, is the creative researcher able to resist this new generic infrastructure of non-thought in the university? Jacques Derrida’s (2002) suggestion was to call for a ‘university without condition’, a site of singular actions with an aesthetic signature that would be indigestible by the factory of academic ‘worldwideization’. Since the 1990s, the political and economic conditions of university life have radically constrained the possibility and significance of such individualised gestures. Perhaps instead we can look to the artistic tradition of institutional critique for guidance on the ethics of infrastructural engagement, though as Isabelle Graw (2008: 303) notes ‘critique implies distance, but this distance has to be renegotiated as well on the basis of the critic’s own implication within this system [this] should have consequences on what we assume and how we operate’. In this framing of complicity, Graw puts us in mind of Spivak’s and Gramsci’s interrogation of the institutionalisation of the intellectual, where rather than figuring the democratic inside the artwork – a perennially popular performance of political aesthetics — the artist as activist must consider their own location within circuits of power, working to understand how such labour maintains or is defective for the operation of that power.

Going private: neoliberal artistic subjectivity as infrastructure

Vishmidt (2017) claims that Kant’s distanciated set-up of art’s autonomy comes to be ‘instrumental in the ‘last instance”’ in so far as it forms a ‘universal subject’ that is fully appropriate to the bourgeois era. To what extent is art’s bracketing of the ‘situation’ that allows an intervention that can be read as ‘artistic’ complicit in reinforcing the axiomatics of dispossession that underwrite it? How would those involved in artistic production unpick that complicity toward models that not only situate the question of inclusion among audiences and the work, but also among all those involved in the networked supply chains of art in a debordered or rebordered aesthetics? This requires a more technical analysis of the forces that constitute audiences through all stages of the artistic project’s lifecycle.

For presenting institutions, the tangibility and specificity of information brought about by new technologies have allowed new kinds of measurement, and fundamentally changed the nature of audiences. Audience development is now a key strategy and performance indicator to be tracked and managed. Far from simply producing the traditional ‘blockbuster’, today the cultural institution is required to specify and develop specific audiences, large and small. Various regimes of value attached to funding and revenue streams constitute this variegated public, which links the development of the wealthy patron to the development of education initiatives and other ‘inclusion’ measures such as diversity and outreach programmes, all falling under the domain of stakeholder development. We can understand network technologies as allowing a new relation between these forms of public, where alternative audiences no longer exist outside the institutions of power but are actively managed by it. This multiplicitous, monitored, and above all managed institutional public sphere also rests on an explicitly sociological conception of the artwork’s public. This type of sociological management is not necessarily to do with the academic discipline of sociology, but is visible in the way new techniques of audience segmentation have a statistical logic that can be graphed with an indicator, tracked with a metric, and visualized on a dashboard. From the 1970s through to the 1990s, academic sociologists such as Erik Olin Wright (1985) tested new class schema by correlating an empirical and theoretical class analysis through economic instruments. They were in some ways ahead of their time but behind the technology, trying to retrofit bad statistics onto a preferred analytical reality. Today the active graphing of segmentable audiences means that the statistical indicator in Stiegler’s (2010) terms has an ‘advance’ on social reality, in that it comes to program the reality of the audience.

With this given, it is curious that Boris Groys should use the introduction to his book Going Public (2010) to launch a critique of what he terms the ‘sociological’ mode of art criticism, when this sociological approach is being fully mobilised by administrators in the actual undergirding infrastructure of artistic audiences. Within modernist and post-modernist artistic production there has always been a kind of generalised resistance to Kant’s diagnostic of the aesthetic experience, a position that sees the viewer as the site where art’s political effects become visible. Most dissenters, like Groys, adopt some version of Nietzsche’s critique that Kant ‘instead of envisaging the aes­thetic problem from the point of view of the artist (creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the “spectator”’, leaving the disinterested definition of the beautiful in which ‘a lack of any refined first-hand experience reposes in the shape of a fat worm of error’ (Nietzsche, 2010: 104). The perspectival seeing and thinking that is the hallmark of the artist is deprioritised in Kant’s critical framework, where he attempts to understand a universalisable and thus ‘democratic’ freedom of the viewer, while the producer is altogether more materially constrained.

Groys is rightly anxious to avoid the illustrative fallacy of political art, where it exhausts its ability to do aesthetic work precisely once it is a recognisable portrait of a political situation. An aesthetic politics should be in the work’s own movement rather than in its representation of the political, it should make the polis rather than talking about it. Yet, Groys seems to turn to a kind of sociological argument of his own in diagnosing today’s participatory condition of art, suggesting that because more people are interested in image production than image contemplation – and he was talking in 2010, before the rise of Instagram – that it is necessary to understand artistic production from the point of view of the producer, and the ‘technical and political decisions for which their subject can be made ethically and politically responsible’ in art’s artificiality. Thus, Groys (2010: 15) suggests, ‘poiesis or techne [rather] than as aisthesis or in terms of hermeneutics’. Ironically, in making this move Groys locates the problem of responsibility in an individualist frame, where an independent artist will act and will then be judged in the social world only after the act has occurred – a version of Hudson’s ‘internalist’ mode of ethical responsibility in the liberal/individualist and latently Christian paradigm.3

Groys acknowledges the artistic persona as fundamental but he does not materialise its production in a way that could see the persona as infrastructural. However, seeing artistic identity as a kind of infrastructure allows us to grapple with the sociological conditions that underpin the production of artistic ethics today, a problematic Groys entirely misses by suggesting that a sociological critique has failed to understand the lessons of the avant-garde. Groys and the historical avant-garde’s aging defenders have failed to understand the lessons of feminist and anti-racist critique, particularly as made within institutional critique. We know today that the actions of the avant-garde rely on specific modes of universalised subjectivity that are impossible to dissociate from the neoliberal ideal of the blank entrepreneurial self. The latent claims to authority embodied in this mode of ‘projectile sovereignty’ (I thank Lauren Berlant for the phrase) are what must be made available for critique if the interventions made on behalf of the public are not to reinforce the axiomatics of domination that are all too familiar in artistic production. To take this a step further: if today the contemporary art world relies on an ‘artistic persona’ at the heart of capital-intensive production, works and practices which do not make available their grounding modes of subjectivity to critique will invariably participate in a kind of ‘privatisation’ of practice that reinforces the privatisation of cultural infrastructure.

Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument

The problematics of artistic personae as infrastructure are well illustrated by the various analyses of Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument, a project commissioned and produced by the Dia Foundation, located in the Forest Houses, a public housing development of the Southeast Bronx in 2013. The Gramsci Monument was a makeshift building constructed of plywood, tarpaulins and Hirschhorn’s signature packing tape, that for one summer housed a media laboratory and library containing Gramsci publications and ephemera, as a platform for engaging the housing estate as a ‘non-exclusive audience’.4 It is one of Hirschhorn’s ongoing attempts to create a ‘universal’ artwork that escapes from terms such as ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ by locating a supposedly public work outside traditional high-visibility public spaces. Julian Rose (2013: 235) describes the Gramsci Monument as ‘the culmination of Hirschhorn’s series of four homages to great thinkers. The evolution of these projects represents a remarkable effort to resurrect both public space and that which has historically defined it: the monument, whether hieratic statue or symbolic space.’ They move from the monolithic Spinoza Monument of 1999, located in the red-light district of Amsterdam, to the Deleuze and Bataille monuments of 2000 and 2002 that are built in collaboration with communities in low-income housing developments and become platforms for a range of community events.

For Gramsci Monument, Hirschhorn sought to dispense with the residual ‘monumental’ aspects of the Bataille monument that he felt distracted from the ‘total artwork’, or the ability to see all the aspects of site that should be associated with the work all at once. As Ara Merjian (2013) notes ‘Hirschhorn has long inveighed against the reduction of art to any moniker – “piece”, “show” or “installation” – that might ossify its necessary, vital precariousness’. This is a clear adoption of the avant-garde position that proposes movement as an important force against the sclerotic tendencies of diagnosed and sociologised culture. The provisional; the temporary; and the improvisational is seen as an expression of freedom or creativity to open up new models of action. The public here is performative, being constructed in the anew at each moment, potentially evading all the forces that constitute it. Hirschhorn thus formulates the ‘non-exclusive audience’ as his target in artistic work (see Rittenbach, 2014). Implicitly, what is valorised here is the force and intensity of the artistic gesture which can create works that could ‘stand up’ and become monumental, even more so by being anti-monumental. The monument would then no longer distract from the artistic persona and gesture. The artist takes these anti-monuments from site to site, demonstrating the possibility of new worlds in a paradigm of mobility and autonomy. Such a mode is particularly ironic in the case of the Gramsci monument, as Gramsci himself noted that intellectuals forged a ‘stratum of administrators, scholars and scientists, theorists, non-ecclesiastical philosophers, etc.’ who come to think of themselves as ‘autonomous and independent of the dominant social group’ (Gramsci, 2009). But for Gramsci this is all an illusion. The production of Hirschhorn’s globally mobile artistic subjectivity that allows such neutrality displaces the very terms of racial dispossession that made the Bronx poor enough to be able to ‘benefit’ from his intervention. Attention to these forces structuring such dispossession have become the grounds for the most effective social movements working from and for public housing communities like those in Forest Houses (Black Lives Matter, for example). The metaphor of the ‘organic’ used by Gramsci points to the fact that one does not choose one’s own institutionalisation into epistemic privilege, something Hirschhorn seems either oblivious to, or wilfully dismissive of.

Responsibility

‘I have always seen my mission’, Hirschhorn (see Oliva and Rezende, 2007) has written, echoing Groys (2010), ‘as taking over responsibility. Responsibility for everything touching my work, but also responsibility for what I am not responsible for.’ As Glenn Ligon’s analysis of the Gramsci Monument noted, Hirschhorn’s taking of responsibility always leads us back to the question of his artistic persona as a type of infrastructure, yet one which remained stubbornly unavailable to the existing people in the site. For Ligon (2013), the way every question led back to Hirschhorn’s position as an artist, however rigorously articulated, resulted in an eventual distancing from the concerns of the community. Hirschhorn’s ultimate accountability to the art world, and thus his artistic persona, was necessary infrastructure – we could think of it like a toll-road – that allowed the Dia Art Foundation to connect to a part of its city that it was not prepared to face directly before this commission. Therefore, when Hirschhorn takes responsibility for his work, rather than sharing it, he performs a privatizing operation that is essential for Dia’s capital to appropriate the Bronx’s difference as an aesthetic opportunity.

Spivak (2004) gave a talk at the monument, and her work on responsibility emphasises that the ability to ‘answer to’ and ‘answer for’ is overdetermined by the institutional constraints that distribute responsibility in advance. ‘At the moment where one “takes” responsibility for authoring one’s actions, one precisely fails to take responsibility for the fact that one can decide to take it’ (Butt, 2016). For Dia’s purposes, as for Hirschhorn’s, the actual events that took place under his responsibility had little effect on the success or failure of how it could be evaluated within the artistic institutions to which they were accountable. In other words, in the formulation of the ethical Spivak provides at the opening of this chapter, Hirschhorn evades an ethical relationship by effacing the opportunity for his responsibility to be held by those he is working with. The problem here can be understood in the developmentalist paradigm as a kind of white man’s burden. The artist becomes machinery that is always looking for a site of investment. Hirschhorn, after all, had a number of meetings in different sites in New York before he was invited to create the monument in the South Bronx.

The most interesting account of the Gramsci Monument came from Fred Moten, as recounted by José Esteban Muñoz (2014: 120):

One interested audience member asked Fred how he felt being there, at the Gramsci Monument, in the Bronx. He talked about feeling good in the space and how rare that feeling could be. He explained that he was always happy to be invited somewhere to speak, but it was a special kind of luxury to really feel good at the place one is happy to be invited to. The audience breathed in that idea of feeling good, on this mild summer day, with the sun shining, in this canyon surrounded by red brick towers where this ship, our ship, had landed. Someone asked him what he thought of Hirschhorn’s project, and he responded by saying that there had always been something here and the installation did not unveil anything new. He used the metaphor of food to elaborate this point. He explained that sometimes, even though not always the healthiest thing to do, one must salt one’s food to really taste the flavor. The bright flavor of this space was brought out by the monument, but that taste had always been there, which is to insist that the effervescence of the actually existing relationality of the Forest Houses and the promise of collectivity was and is always present in such spaces.

To conceive of one’s own work as a kind of seasoning requires us to understand our own work as supplementary to social forces much larger than ourselves, and thus in a certain way to allow responsibility to be held in the meal itself. Salt production occurs in many communities across the globe, and yet no one would want to eat a meal of salt. The conditions of salt production are also, in some places, synonymous with exploitation. Perhaps Moten’s metaphor gives us a way to think about our own institutionalisation in the salt mines of culture: if our aesthetic seasoning were to be produced ethically, what would a cooperative for salt production look like, against the industrially scaled salt makers?

Against the extractive modes of fly-in fly-out aesthetic infrastructure, if we think today about public political movements such as Occupy, or the indigenous-led activism at Standing Rock and the North Dakota Access Pipeline, a prominent mechanism for going public is through refusal to be moved on, and the use of networks not to discover new territories for exploration, but to defend them against instrumental incursions. Against the settler colonial paradigm of movement, these protests speak to an ecological concern with a responsibility for infrastructure that exceeds the individual. On the one hand these movements represent a practice of collective autonomy: the ability to propose a collaborative answer to the question of movement and relation, rather than having it imposed. However, in the case of Standing Rock and other struggles against neo-colonial extraction, it also speaks to an extended temporality of struggle that situates action outside the human-directed event and into an ecological or planetary time to which we become responsible, rather than taking responsibility for it. Such an orientation refuses to override ethical concerns for political ends, or to put it in Derrida’s terms, this mode refuses all externally-mandated conditions, and becomes an ‘unconditional’ commitment that we can understand as the hallmark of the professor. In this ecological terrain, professorial complaints about the changing character of universities as workplaces focused on compliance and profit have a shared basis with student demands for consumer satisfaction and ethical institutional behaviour.5 To affirm such demands ethically and politically, that is to say, practically, may require us to subject our own ambivalent positions in education’s economic logic to more stringent critique. This critique will require more organisational and financial literacy than artistic subjectivity has traditionally rewarded, but brings with it the potential for alliance not only with our students but with other groups resistant to neoliberalisation. This would allow us to displace questions of responsibility as right into collective actions that forge solidarities with those from outside the institution’s walls, rather than treating such communities as targets of our natural beneficence. This mode of ethical reflection, which engages the politics of our own institutionalisation, rather than disavowing it, is harder to adjudicate through our inherited academic mechanisms, but it perhaps better serves the communities outside the university who ultimately sustain artistic research.

Notes

1. Universities increasingly contract such functions externally to global infrastructure firms – see for example the University of Newcastle’s award of a five year $88 million integrated facilities management and property services contract to Transfield Services / Broadspectrum in 2015. The potential for this overhead to stifle artistic research is further elaborated in my essay “How Artistic Research Ends” (Melbourne: Research Unit in Public Cultures) 2020. This section includes material published there and in Artistic Research in the Future Academy (2017)

2. For a range of responses to the Business Improvement Program, see Campbell, Marion, and Philip Morrissey, eds. 2016. The People’s Tribunal: An Inquiry into the “Business Improvement Program” at The University of Melbourne. Melbourne: Aboriginal Humanities Project in association with Discipline.

3. I have pursued this problem of responsibility at length in Danny Butt and Local Time, “Colonial Hospitality: Rethinking Curatorial and Artistic Responsibility,” Journal for Artistic Research, no. 10 (2016), https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/228399/264279.

4. For a good account see Valle, Luisa. 2015. “Object Lesson: Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument: Negotiating Monumentality with Instability and Everyday Life.” Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum 22 (2). 18–35. Also Hirschhorn’s own “Gramsci Monument” in Rethinking Marxism 27 (2): 213–40.

5. This conjuncture was on display in the actions against the University of Sydney taken by students at Sydney College of the Arts. See Joyner, Tom. 2016. “More than 130 Students Take on Sydney University for Alleged Breach of Consumer Law – Honi Soit.” Honi Soit. August 9. http://honisoit.com/2016/08/more-than-130-students-take-on-sydney-university-for-alleged-breach-of-consumer-law/

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Butt D (2020) How Artistic Research Ends. Melbourne: Research Unit in Public Cultures.
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How Artistic Research Ends

Butt, D. How Artistic Research Ends. 1st ed. Vol. RUPC #7 / Surpllus #13.7. RUPC Series. Melbourne, Australia: Surpllus, 2020.

We know how artistic research begins, more or less: The new mode of specialist study in the humanities filters from Germany to the US in the 19th century and then into the massive growth of Anglophone universities through the European colonies in the 20th century. Integration and rationalisation of higher education systems, combined with pressures to achieve value from declining research investments in a new managerialist culture in the late 20th century, bring about a raft of research assessment regimes from the 1990s onward. As Eric Ashby describes it in the 1960s, where once the university was cultivated as a garden flower, of no more significance to the prince or bishop than the court musician; the modern university is expected to be a yield-bearing crop[1]. In this trajectory of artistic research, the intellectual question of what knowledge is held in the art object, a question implied by conceptualism and post-Bauhaus practices, is perhaps in play behind the scenes but remains more of a boutique curiosity. For the education and innovation policy-maker the calculus is blunt: all research must be assessed in order to make funding decisions, but in a nationally integrated system only one assessment instrument will be developed to fit all disciplines. Therefore, all scholarly activity that happens in universities will become research. Artistic practice in the university becomes research regardless of its adherence to historical frameworks of knowledge in the scientific sense, or its connection to an art world conception of what might constitute a research-driven practice.

As James Elkins is always quick to point out, the primary drivers of artistic research here are economic, bureaucratic and administrative[2]. I discuss this story in a recent book[3]. But what happens if the administrative drivers radically change, with neoliberal austerity measures placing severe constraints on new graduate programmes in the humanities, creative arts and social sciences? As existing programmes undergo rationalisation and consolidation, what if the already declining research funding for the arts will no longer be a major part of the economic calculus in universities? What if government, rather than making more or less good faith attempts to rein in tertiary education spending through effective modes of research assessment, decides it can’t deal with the problem and an easier option is to stop funding creative arts, humanities and social sciences research entirely? What if, in other words, artistic research ends? I will propose four likely ends for artistic research: a cut, a cultural shift; a cramp; and a coup.

But firstly to return to how we arrived at the current conjuncture. The growth and diversification of universities in the 20th century brought all forms of knowledge into the academy as legitimate objects of study. Industrialisation, colonisation and the improving mindset of modernism then turned Anglophone universities from places of cultural reproduction into centres of knowledge, innovation and human capital development.  As humanist practices expanded and diversified, they would incorporated into a research framework as they both incorporated language from the social sciences. Research, until the 1960s overwhelmingly dominated by military and agricultural priorities, would expand in turn. Let’s look in more detail at this transformation in scale.

The end of the Second World War brought a social problem: a large number of military men with nothing to do. The US government’s solution, soon to be copied by other nations, was to send them to universities. The 1944 GI Bill of Rights contributed to university and college enrolment growth, which went from 1.36 million in 1939 to 2.08 million in 1946 – over one million of whom were veterans[4]. Widening participation through the 1970s also became a policy solution to youth unemployment in the former British empire during a period of economic downturn. Participation grew from 10 to 30% in most EU countries between 1960 to 1990, where the number of students multiplied nine-fold[5]. To put those figures in historical perspective, overall tertiary education participation in Europe doubled from 0.46% of the student age group in 1860 to 0.88% in 1900, and 2.07% in 1940[6]. In Perkin’s terms the leading countries upped the participation rate of the student age group in tertiary education dramatically from under 10% in 1960 to 50% or more by 2000 —in the UK this went from 9% to 60% over the forty year period[7].

During this growth, the university as an elite institution producing the managerial class begins to give way to a broader narrative of access and human capital development, and in the 1990s, as many state systems moved research funding from education to innovation portfolios, some European countries doubled their Ph.D. output in a decade. In Australia, for example, numbers rose from 8563 enrolled Ph.D. candidates in 1988 to almost forty thousand doctoral candidates in 2004[8]. This growth of higher education had brought a massive expansion in those studying and teaching art, not only in the UK with practices to be assessed as research, with almost one million students studying the visual and performing arts at post-secondary level in the United States in 2012, and almost one hundred thousand in Australia[9]. Just as art has come to be seen as a part of a creative economy, naturally entrepreneurial, art education has itself become a major industry.

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In the early 1990s I never thought that my creative work would have a home in the university system or considered it likely that I would work in tertiary education. However I experienced a set of confluences over the same period that relate to the situation in universities, and I now see my own example as relevant to the trajectory of artistic research. I was the first person in my family to go to university, and dropped out of my undergraduate education in sociology in 1991 to move to Sydney and play in a band, and then soon moved to Aotearoa New Zealand, where the experimental music scene was intimately tied to the visual arts. As someone who grew up outside the city, the visual arts had until then been something of a mystery, but it seemed something I could learn by doing (the idea of a “practice” was only just emerging), and my self-education in cultural theory gave me a role in the hybrid discourses of criticism. In 1992 the arrival of the world wide web, and my participation in a burgeoning new media scene—firstly in artistic, then commercial projects—brought a new status for information processing skills that I would later characterise as research.

Running a web development startup required two skills: learning the emergent discipline of user interface design (which involved “user testing” as an important principle) and the unprecedented ability to track a startup “business culture” in the dotcom era (where one could copy the operational modes, discourses and presentation strategies of US-based firms in an unprecedented way).  These two modes – both a kind of research outside the academy – brought a new leverage for what I would today describe as method. I had started teaching digital media and design at a technical institute, and rode the development of the “creative industries” to build research infrastructure to support the integration of art and design academics into NZ’s first Performance Based Research Fund in 2003.

In my autobiographical narrative, the growth of artistic research is indivisible from my participation in artist-run initiatives and the dotcom sector in the 1990s, and this leads me to reflect on artistic research as a kind of gentrification of artistic methods and the artistic imaginary. In the research frame, rather than simply producing something, artistic practices should aim toward broader significance, in a public or audience reconceived as scholarly, that is to say, elite and global. To do so, it should ideally propose questions and answer them through some kind of systematic method, and as Derrida reminds us the etymology of method comes via the Greek hodos – a path that becomes a meta-path. In artistic research one should turn a path into a road (if not a “roadmap”), to potentially create an asset that can be monetised in a larger, fully international information economy. We could also see here the fortunes of artistic research as linked to the growth in the biennale circuit, with its interest in informational and discursive practices, and the expanded economic claims for placemaking that the large scale international exhibition involves. But this is more speculative.

The 1990s linked promises implied across all three domains: artist run initiatives, new media, and artistic research. In all three cases these practices navigated outside the dynamics of state support and nationalised capital, mirroring the transnational flows of brands and finance. What was common to the university art schools during the artistic research era was a period of policy emphasis on growth and innovation. As art and design schools found themselves in universities where they had to battle for resources and meet targets alongside other disciplines, some problems for art and design departments became clear: firstly, the lack of large-scale research income that was becoming the default measure of research performance in other disciplines, and secondly, a system of casual staffing that involved professionals with no particular relationship to the institution, as opposed to the standard disciplinary focus on the employment of graduate students and thus the development of neo-feudal institutional pipelines of research mentorship. A solution to these problems was the growth in doctoral programmes, and in particular the PhD and a certain “scientification” of knowledge in the arts.

All through the 20th century, a discourse within the fine arts is highly conscious of being on the back foot inside the university compared to its scientific peers: in the United States the early 20th century debates in the College Art Association advocate for the Bachelors Degree in Art to embrace the “more scientific” mode of learning through drawing, alongside the East Coast’s traditional emphasis on artistic knowledge as being held through viewing[10]. In the 1930s the Museum of Modern Art director Alfred H. Barr called for the development of further M.F.A.s and doctoral programmes to integrate studio teaching and art history, so that artists and historians could forge “a more complete understanding of Modern Art”[11].

Therefore, in order to understand what is happening to artistic research in the university, we should firstly understand what happened to the scientific knowledge paradigm, which underwrote the development of universities through the 20th century, specifically through the funding of research. Nowotny, Gibbons and Scott’s Rethinking Science places the beginnings of the loss of faith in science at the unforeseen early 1970s oil crisis and 1989 end of the cold war[12], and it is most clearly exhibited today in the failure of scientific consensus on climate change to substantially drive policy change in the face of amateur scepticism. On the other hand, science has become a “common cultural currency,” as Thrift describes it, explaining everything from gender relations and human behaviour (previously non-scientific) to the nature of the cosmos[13]. As science tended toward more statistically-driven means to stabilise reality, so too we have all, in a certain way, become scientists through various means of technological sensing and self-tracking – testing hypotheses, adjusting our measurement instruments, creating new models of life. And scientific practice today is not a high church above the secular world, but is justified through an ethic of neo-liberal productivity for capital; characterized by a transition from winning prizes to winning grants. As the entry costs for curiosity-driven research skyrocket, grants are oversubscribed, and returns are expected to be larger and to be found more quickly. As Fuller succinctly describes it, the “nationalist mentality prone to interpret scientists’ cross-border associations as potential acts of espionage or treason has yielded to a less consistently stoked paranoia about unprotected intellectual property and unexploited economic opportunities.[14]

Just as theology gave way to science as the authorising principle of the universities in the 19th century, at the end of the 20th century science has lost its authorising function to finance. Science is no longer the dominant enterprise in the university as it was at the beginning of the artistic research debates: the major field of study for postgraduate students today is business and commerce, constituting a full quarter of Australian enrolments, compared to under ten percent for the natural and physical sciences[15]. This shift in university enrolments makes sense, for as Marina Vishmidt has noted, education “has become one of the most highly commodified and instrumentalised sectors worldwide and debt slavery and ‘employability’ are the real products of most universities[16].” Students are ultimately seeking education in the financial principles that strictly govern their potential futures in a way that was not the case for those a generation earlier.

Scientific research is most challenged by finance not as an academic discipline or in the market competition for students, however, but by finance’s new as the dominant governing ratio of the university’s internal organisation. Methodological distinctions between the arts, sciences, and commerce are rendered moot through the evisceration of discipline-specific research infrastructure and the occupation of university research by a new generic set of operations under the ever-expanding category of “overhead”: risk management; commercialisation; construction and property services; intellectual property; contract management; security; insurance; service-oriented architectures; organisational reviews; stakeholder management; monitoring and compliance; occupational health and safety; space utilisation charges; governance; business intelligence; and portfolio management to name but a few domains of practice that will be familiar to any university administrator.

There is little of interest to say about the growth of these new domains in the university, except that they are impervious to academic knowledge of the type generated in research, scientific or otherwise. Yet these infrastructural forces today structure the possibilities of ethical engagement within the academy, and bring about a new terrain for artistic research which it has so far rarely engaged with.

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In his 1985 book How Experiments End, Peter Galison’s case studies in microphysics show how experimental practices can operate relatively independently of the higher level theoretical justifications that sometimes justify them. But at a certain point, experiments are abandoned as a scientific community converges to to adopt a particular discursive repertoire that rules out the need to explore alternative explanations, which is the search that drives experimental practice.[17]

One can see the relevance of this mode of analysis for how artistic research might end. Many practices that have emerged from students this an artistic research paradigm would not necessarily be much different than a sustained project outside the academy. Yet, the academic mode requires that practices be placed into a purportedly global archive of equivalence, exerting a certain kind of pressure for integration that disrupts the internal development of subjective relation to materials, and also the more customary local sense of artistic practices. It becomes an authorising institutional discourse, that even for the most hermetic practitioner sorts material experimentation toward specific outcomes that can be accounted for within a global academic framework.

This disciplining is of no particular concern while artistic research continued to grow: the very artificiality of the frame can produce interesting new responses. But if, as I have suggested above, our immediate future will see a contraction of investment and opportunity in the area of artistic research, combined with an institutional logic which is not derived from academic disciplinarity and this is the “convergence”, rather than any discursive convergence in practices, that requires us ask how artistic research as a will maintain its historical trajectory as it attempts to salvage existing infrastructures and the opportunity that it seemed to provide.

As I suggested, to me me there are some clear directions that indicate how artistic research ends:

Firstly and most obviously, government funding for artistic research in the former West will continue to contract as it has for the humanities and social sciences generally. This is the cut. Tertiary education is reconfigured as a private good, rather than as a public investment in a national managerial class for human capital development. If you want an artistic education you will pay for it yourself. Knowledge-based artistic practices become the preserve of the elite, a dynamic that is reflected in the difficulties university-based research finds in making meaningful engagement with new social movements looking to build independent infrastructures.

The prestigious institutions, such as my own, will be insulated from financial shock through the philanthropy of alumni and other patrons. Perhaps through the influence of large-scale international exhibitions and heavily planned seasonal programming for specific audiences, programmes of artistic research will come to rely on intensive capital investment from this same highly concentrated class of patrons, who are either donors with existing personal relationships to the sector or corporations looking to brand-wash their otherwise unaesthetic activities. It may be that future programmes of artistic research are directly integrated into recurring funding associated with biennales and similar large-scale international exhibitions.

Such a move would be in concert with the increasing restrictions on the ability to undertake scientific research inside the university system, where patronage is key, and a good idea and stellar academic track record does not necessarily lead to research opportunity. To claim a democratic impulse for artistic research in this scenario will be something of a stretch. More likely is the continued proliferation of theatres of participation via “socially engaged” works that stage figures of inclusion without ever threatening the coherence of art’s class-bound frames of affect management and developmentalism.

Secondly, we may see a decolonisation and globalisation of artistic research where it becomes structured by very different epistemological and ontological concerns.  Many have noted the geospatial distribution of artistic research among the UK and its former colonies, and Scandinavia, which more or less tracks in the institutions that have extensively integrated research assessment and nation-state funding through the 20th century. “The Humboldtian model” of the university that has dominated the modern university imaginary emerges from cultural nationalism, a concept of limited value in the global and post-multicultural era. In the Anglophone case, we can view cultural nationalism as essentially a structure to support legacies of wealth extracted through settler colonial legacies of cultural and economic management. We are now in a different political-economic situation for both “gown and town”, as patterns of global university investment, and the financial structures of external infrastructure it seeks to provide human capital for are now thoroughly global.

This pressure on a European (Euro-American) frame for artistic research may be seen from two cultural domains: firstly, internal to settler colonial nations, the rise of Indigenous and decolonial research practices asks for a recalibration of the purpose and audience of artistic inquiry. Against the extractive model of research, where an individual is held to discover information and become authorised to disseminate it in a network of prestige, the development of Indigenous research explicitly formulates a community outside the academy as both the source and agent of knowledge to which the cultural worker apprentices themselves. This suggests entirely new audiences and review mechanisms for artistic research in this paradigm.

From the perspective of globalisation, the growth in networks of Chinese-language scholarship in particular points to the decline of European languages as the default for the international mediation of knowledge. Not only are the demographics overwhelming, networked media now allow a generic research publishing infrastructure to be immediately localised. Over the last 10 years within the intergovernmental sector which provides much of the more deliberative justification for research, the levels of dissatisfaction with the default European languages as adequate is growing.

While these two forces are very different in their drivers, both point to a dissipation of the Kantian cosmopolitan European as the ideal type of student. Not only was this never a truly global entity in the way it imagined itself to be, the constraints on international mobility currently being enforced through global securitisation point to all kinds of reordering of academic bodies. It may be that the audience for artistic research becomes more effectively localised, especially among linguistic communities with traditions of knowledge traditions that differ from the European heritage. Perhaps here research redefines what constitutes a “stock” of knowledge, from an open-access database in the cloud to a more self-consciously materially and culturally located practice, which may no longer look like research as it has been understood, particularly with respect to the implicit proportionality of artistic research’s reach.

Thirdly, the entire concept of research may turn out to bureaucratise artistic practices to the extent that it can no longer be a viable frame for practitioners. Here I am not talking about a kind of theoretical bureaucratisation that concerned Picasso, Duchamp or today someone like Elkins, where art is made less interesting by being conceived as research. More mundanely, the situating of any practice inside the university today mandates adherence to managerial policies and procedures discussed above that govern every part of the artistic process from conception of the idea as intellectual property; to materials handling; to audience interaction; to the preferred supplier of catering; to marketing and branding; to sales and economic exchange. As noted previously, these constraints challenge the university as a space of innovation, as the university becomes an entity that enforces risk management ratios which are conceived outside the institution itself in best practices mandated via insurance and compliance. I think of this as a kind of cramp.

Fourthly, and perhaps recapitulating all of the above, students who have been sold into debt bondage may decide that a destruction of the universities is the best way to collectively free themselves from the university as a creditor, in which case all of us, and our research, may well be first against the wall. This would be the coup. An anecdote which does not make it into the book involves Maggi Phillips’ writing on dance workshops where one of the participants discusses the value of the university space where the creative arts can also ponder, in a truly philosophical sense, the nature of its own death:                                         

…should it come to the point where we all realise that dance is a moribund form that we ought to exterminate, that would be something that would also come out of the academy. It is not necessarily simply an act of preserving something or endlessly extolling a particular set of aesthetic values. It’s as much about interrogating and putting [the discipline] up to radical scrutiny, so that’s why we should have [Ph.D.s]. (Phillips, 2009: 226)

Perhaps today we need to take this one step further, in the spirit of methodological reflection, and consider whether the academy can ask itself hard questions about its necessity to exist in the new paradigms of knowledge that are emerging in the post-internet environment. In Edinburgh in 1582, Berlin in 1810 or Johns Hopkins’ graduate school in 1876, new times resulted in the construction of new institutions of knowledge, that described themselves as universities but set future scholarship in a new direction. My sense is that this is the exit that artistic research is looking for.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Ashby, Eric. “The Future of the Nineteenth Century Idea of a University.” Minerva 6, no. 1 (1967): 3–17.

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Elkins, James. “On Beyond Research and New Knowledge.” In Artists with PhDs: On the New Doctoral Degree in Studio Art, 111–34. Washington: New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2009.

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Thrift, Nigel. “The Place of Complexity.” Theory, Culture & Society 16, no. 3 (1999): 31–69.

Trow, Martin A., and Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education. [Berkeley, Calif.]: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973.


[1]  Ashby, “The Future of the Nineteenth Century Idea of a University,” 8.

[2] Elkins, “On Beyond Research and New Knowledge.”

[3] Butt, Artistic Research in the Future Academy.

[4] Funk, “The Development of Professional Studio Art Training, in American Higher Education, 1860-1960,” 154.

[5] Geuna, “The Changing Rationale for European University Research Funding : Are There Negative Unintended Consequences ?,” 609., Trow and on Higher Education., Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education.

[6] Perkin, “History of Universities,” 175.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Pearson, Evans, and Macauley, “Growth and Diversity in Doctoral Education: Assessing the Australian Experience,” 357–358.

[9] National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)., “‘Enrollment in Postsecondary Education, by Level of Enrollment, Level of Institution, Student Age, and Major Field of Study: 2011-12.’”

[10] Funk, “The Development of Professional Studio Art Training, in American Higher Education, 1860-1960,” 60–63.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons, Re-Thinking Science : Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty.

[13] Thrift, “The Place of Complexity.”

[14] Fuller, The Philosophy of Science and Technology Studies, 76.

[15] ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) 2005. Education and work, Australia, May 2015. ABS cat. no. 6227.0. Canberra: ABS.

[16] Krauss, Pethick, and Vishmidt, “Spaces of Unexpected Learning 2.”

[17] Galison, How Experiments End.

Arts and Communities syllabus

Below the reading list for the two “Arts and Communities” theory classes I taught for the Master of Arts and Community Practice at the Centre for Cultural Partnerships (CCP), Victorian College of the Arts, University of Melbourne in 2016. These are not the final version presented to students, which were supplemented by a number of texts from the various participants in the courses. Histories and Sites was also taught before Values and Methods, though pedagogically it should have probably been the other way around. The topics were developed by CCP staff in a collaborative workshop session I facilitated in 2015, though the descriptions represent more my own interests. The bibliography largely represents my own best attempt at an archive, though input also came from CCP staff Lachlan MacDowall, Marnie Badham, James Oliver, Dean Merlino, Jen Rae, Margie Mackay, Amy Spiers, and also Tania Cañas and Léuli Eshraghi who co-taught the Values and Methods class. There are a few missing readings from the PDFs but hopefully both the list and readings are useful. If you have content in the PDFs which you would like not to be online please let me know danny at dannybutt.net. Please also let me know if this turns out to be useful for you in some way – hoping to continue to build on this archive in a more collaborative fashion. xx

Arts and Communities: Values and Methods Reader – PDF (93MB)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2A0k6xhkuiIU3NkZUVtYU9HdWs

Arts and Communities: Histories and Sites Reader – PDF (58MB) – https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B2A0k6xhkuiINjRpa3Z6cGxaeG8

CCDP90009 – 2016 Arts and Communities: Values and Methods

Week 1: Liberalism and its Discontents: Structural Inequality and Democracy

The democratic state that dominates Western political thought emerges from the liberal tradition, where each person is assumed to be freely in charge of their own actions, even though the distribution of such freedom is clearly unequal. A number of oppositional traditions have asked, what forces are required to construct an individual? These questions – emerging from marxist, feminist, indigenous and other positions – destabilise our idea of the citizen and open our sense of collectivity to new genres of action.

Required Reading:

Hannah Arendt, “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest, 1966), 290-302. http://digilib.bc.edu/reserves/po659/chac/po65905.pdf.

Land, Clare. 2015. Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles. London: Zed Books. Chapter 2: “A political genealogy for contemporary non-Indigenous activism in Australia”

Claudia Rankine, Citizen: An American Lyric. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press. 2014.  Chapter 3

Recommended Reading:

Lauren Berlant, “Claudia Rankine” (Interview). BOMB 129. 2014. http://bombmagazine.org/article/10096/claudia-rankine

Reckitt, Helena. “Forgotten Relations: Feminist Artists and Relational Aesthetics.” In Politics in a Glass: Case Feminism, Exhibition Cultures and Curatorial Transgressions. Edited by Angela Dimitrakaki and Lara Perry. Value: Art: Politics. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, July, 2013. http://research.gold.ac.uk/7103/

Kester, Grant H. Conversation Pieces : Community and Communication in Modern Art. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Chapter Three “Dialogical Aesthetics”

Week 2: Human Rights and Human Development

The Declaration of the rights of Man and of the Citizen, passed by France’s National Constituent Assembly in August 1789, marks a transition from natural law being managed through the church to a Christian nation-state, whose form became globalised through the processes of European colonisation. The concept of “human rights” remains one of the strongest discourses to be mobilised against oppression, yet this discourse has also been critiqued for its universalism. Similarly, the concept of human development flourished during the peak era of intergovernmentalism in the United Nations (1945- ~1990) but the mechanisms of development have more recently come in for critique as they are circumvented and infiltrated by private capital. How are these discourses still relevant and what work can they do in contemporary communities? As well as thinking of “human rights”, could we also think about “human wrongs”? Can the idea of developing communities co-exist with a self-determination framework?

Required Reading

Amartya Sen. 2005. “Human Rights and Capabilities.” Journal of Human Development 6 (2): 151–66.

Escobar, Arturo. 1992. “Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements.” Social Text, no. 31/32. 20–56.

Kester, Grant. 2011. The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context. Art Theory and Criticism. Duke University Press. Chapter Two (excerpt) 116-153

Recommended Reading

Cohen, Jean L. 2008. “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization.” Political Theory, 36(4): 578-606.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2004. “Righting Wrongs.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2-3): 523–81.

Week 3: Modernity / Postmodernity

Modernism was a consensus of Western-educated people about the structure of history, identity and core cultural values. In the logic of modernism, history has passed and contemporary activity will depart from that past into a progressive future. Postmodernity  is described from the 1970s as a collapse in that consensus – modernist ideals have not go away, but they can no longer claim to be the only true path – narratives and meta-narratives of history become conflicted.

Required Reading:

Benjamin, Walter. 1968. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” In Illuminations, 217–51. New York: Random House.

Haraway, Donna J. 1991. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.” In Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 149–81. New York: Routledge

Kapur, Geeta. 1990. “Contemporary Cultural Practice: Some Polemical Categories.” Third Text 4 (11): 109–18.

Recommended:

Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 1, “The Precession of Simulation.”

Week 4: Critical Approaches to Community

The double bind of community: communities are naturally occurring groups, that evolve with no set plan. Yet communities are identified by those wishing to change those plans, by definition departing from an organic approach to community and toward an intentional one. On what grounds can intentional communities be diagnosed or constructed?

Rimi Khan: “From Consensual to Open-Ended Communities”, in Art in Community: The Provisional Citizen (Palgrave 2015) pp. 14-36

Jackson, Shannon. “Quality Time: Social Practice Debates in Contemporary Art.” Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics. London: Routledge, 2011. 54-86.

Joseph, Miranda. “Introduction: Persistent Critique, Relentless Return.” Against the Romance of Community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Vii-xxxvi.

Recommended:

Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1991. The Inoperative Community. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press. Chapter One.

Week 5: Qualitative Research, the Ethnographic Eye, and the Politics of Knowledge

The community artist is often sponsored by a state or corporation that has sought knowledge about a community for its own ends. What does it mean to understand a community ethnographically, to visit for a time and inductively form a structure? What is the relationship between those who visit and those who always remain? How do knowledge-making practices travel across such differences?

Required Reading

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “R-Words: Refusing Research.” Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative Inquiry with Youth and Communities. Ed. Django Paris and Maisha T. Winn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013. 223-248.

Rangan, Pooja. 2011. “Immaterial Child Labor: Media Advocacy, Autoethnography, and the Case of Born into Brothels.” Camera Obscura 25 (3 75): 143–77.

Janke, Terri. 2015. “Chapter 7: Avatar Dreaming: Indigenous Cultural Protocols and Making Films Using Indigenous Content.” In Indigenous Intellectual Property: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, edited by Matthew Rimmer, 177–99. Research Handbooks in Intellectual Property Series. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Recommended Reading

Alcoff, Linda. “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” Cultural Critique 20 (1991): 5-3

Week 6: Mythology, Story and Narrative

For the Native American writer Thomas King, “the truth about stories is that is all we are”. Some stories may be legitimated (governmental stories, scientific stories) and some not, but story is the process by which we give meaning to phenomena. Story and myth are often ritualised, told and received as much because of the conditions of their telling (such and such a person was here; at this time of the day we tell stories; we need a story to sell this product; I need to find a way to convey this information) as any actual content. How do we engage different genres of narrative and story, across different institutions?

Required Reading:

King, Thomas. 2003. The truth about stories: A Native narrative. Toronto, ON: Anansi Press.  Chapter 1. [CBC lectures: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzXQoZ6pE-M ].

Cybermohalla Ensemble. “On Writing.” Cybermohalla Hub. Ed. Nikolaus Hirsch and Shveta Sarda. Delhi/ Berlin: Sarai-CSDS/Sternberg Press, 2012. 14-20

Recommended Reading:

Richardson, Laurel, and Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre. “Writing: A Method of Inquiry.” The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. Ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi: Sage, 2007. 959-978.

Week 7: Art and Health – Readings and materials TBC

Week 8: Nation, Culture and Citizenship

For much of the 20th century, official discourses of culture related to the nation state, and thus to citizenship. However, in greater number since the 1980s, the state is seen as being able to embrace many cultures. What does this mean for citizenship as a mechanism of belonging? What is the relationship between multiculturalism and indigenous culture in settler societies? How does this state conjuncture relate to “private” “cultural” practices such as food, religion, etc?

Required Reading:

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Culture Alive.” Theory, Culture & Society 23. 2-3 (May, 2006): 359-360.

Rickard, Jolene. 2011. “Visualizing Sovereignty in the Time of Biometric Sensors.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 110 (2): 465–86.

Langton, Marcia. 1993. “ Well, I Heard It on the Radio and I Saw It on the Television”: An Essay for the Australian Film Commission on the Politics and Aesthetics of Filmmaking by and about Aboriginal People and Things. Australian Film Commission Sydney.

Recommended Reading:

Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.” Public Culture 2: 1–24.

Week 9: Ethics

The movement of artistic practices into the academy, and the emergence of claims to self-determination has brought with it an increased focus on ethics in community-engaged practices. Far from artistic interventions being seen as only positive, the ethical paradigm requires artists to consider more dialogical engagements with communities, and to critically assess their own power. Are these dynamics predictable in advance? Do they impose constraints on the value of artistic actions, which usually present their own autonomy? .

Required Reading:

Bolt, Barbara. “Beneficence and contemporary art: when aesthetic judgment meets ethical judgment.” Visual Methodologies,  v. 3, n. 2, p. 53-66, dec. 2015. ISSN 2040-5456. Available at: <http://journals.sfu.ca/vm/index.php/vm/article/view/51>.

Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. 1999. “Ethical Research Protocols” in Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Dunedin: University of Otago Press. 118-122.

Thornley, Jeni. “Island Home Country: Working with Aboriginal Protocols in a Documentary Film About Colonisation and Growing Up White in Tasmania.” in Passionate Histories: Myth, Memory and Indigenous Australia. Ed. Frances Peters-Little, Ann Curthoys, and John Docker. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2010. 247-280.

Recommended Reading:

Danny Butt and Local Time, 2016. “Colonial hospitality: rethinking curatorial and artistic responsibility”, Journal for Artistic Research 10 (2016) https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/228399/264279/0/0

Treloyn, S. & Charles, R. G. (2014). How do you feel about squeezing oranges?: Reflections and lessons on collaboration in ethnomusicological research in an Aboriginal Australian community. In K. Barney, (Ed.), Collaborative ethnomusicology: New approaches to music research between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Australians. Melbourne, VIC: Lyrebird Press. 169-186.

 

Week 10: Affect, Aesthetics, Creativity

The term “aesthetic” is commonly used to discuss the “artistic” aspects of form, as opposed to the content. However, for Kant and other philosophers who have influenced our use of the term, the aesthetic is a much deeper force that describes a space where the human senses the free play of concepts in a form not dictated by the tight confines of reason, enabling the possibility of new modes of thinking and social ordering to emerge. In the late 20th century, influenced by psychological researchers such as Tomkins and philosophers Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of “affect” gains traction as a mode of analysis that operates outside the residual logics of philosophical aesthetics and their propositional subject.

Required Reading:

Bourriaud, Nicolas. 1998. Relational Aesthetics. Les Presse Du Reel, France. Chapter Three & 4: “Art of the 1990s” and “Space time exchange factors.” 24-48.

Ahmed, Sara. 2014. “Introduction: Feel Your Way”, from The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge. 1-19.

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, and Adam Frank. 1995. “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins.” Critical Inquiry 21 (2). 496–522.

Recommended Reading:

Felix Gonzalez-Torres, “1990: L.A., “The Gold Field”,” in Roni Horn. Earths Grow Thick (Columbus: Wexner Center for the Arts Publication, 1996), 68.

Najafi, Sina, David Serlin, and Lauren Berlant. 2014. “The Broken Circuit: An Interview with Lauren Berlant.” Cabinet 31. http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/31/najafi_serlin.php.

Ball, Karyn. 2008. “Primal Revenge and Other Anthropomorphic Projections for Literary History.” New Literary History 39 (3). 533–63.

Week 11: Capital, Economy and the Market – social economies

According to the curator Charles Esche, all cultural funding in the former west can be linked to the Cold War and the desire for governments to demonstrate the cultural superiority of individualist freedom over socialist collectivity, and since 1989 this mandate for cultural support has declined. In the context of neoliberalism, the ability of nations to maintain their cultural and economic sovereignty has become ruptured, as global finance capital permeates territorial borders, while reinforcing different kinds of divides between firms, individuals and nation states. How are arts practitioners responding to these new flows of capital? What role to divestment and boycott campaigns have in contemporary cultural politics? How does the artist survive in a financialised community while avoiding exploitation and being exploited?

Required Reading:

Bourdieu, Pierre. (1986) The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (New York, Greenwood), 241-258.

Hopkins, Candice. “The Golden Potlatch
: Study in Mimesis and Capitalist Desire.” Fillip 13

Purves, Ted., and S. A. Selzer. 2014. What We Want Is Free, Second Edition: Critical Exchanges in Recent Art. State University of New York Press. (Chs 1 & 2)

Recommended Reading:

Colapinto, John. “The Real-Estate Artist.” [Theaster Gates] The New Yorker  January 29, 2015. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/20/the-real-estate-artist>

Week 12: Governance, Bureaucracy, Evaluation

Required Reading:

Gressel, Katherine. “Public Art and the Challenge of Evaluation.” Createquity. January 7, 2012. Web. <http://createquity.com/2012/01/public-art-and-the-challenge-of-evaluation/>.

Belfiore, Eleonora, and Oliver Bennett. “Beyond the “Toolkit Approach”: Arts Impact Evaluation Research and the Realities of Cultural Policy‐Making.” Journal for Cultural Research 14.2 (March 24, 2010): 121-142.

Hope, Sophie. “Cultural measurement on whose terms? Critical friends as an experiment in participant-led evaluation.” In Making Culture Count, pp. 282-297. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015.

Norris, Niles. “The Politics of Evaluation and the Methodological Imagination.” American Journal of Evaluation 26.4 (December 1, 2005): 584-586.

 

CCDP90007 – 2016 Arts and Communities: Histories and Sites

Week 1: Arrival and welcome

Recommended Reading:

Birch, Tony “Nothing has changed: The Making and Unmaking of Koori Culture”,  in Grossman, Michèle. Blacklines : Contemporary Critical Writing by Indigenous Australians (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 97-103.

Edmonds, Fran, Lee Darroch, Maree Clarke, and Vicki Couzens. “Ancestral Memory Out of the Shadows.” Artlink 32.2 (2012): 56-61.

Anonymous. “The Art of the Question: Thinking Like a Public Artist.” The Practice of Public Art, eds. Cameron Cartiere and Shelly Willis. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 219-230.

Week 2: Community art and social practice: navigating sites of power and representation

In recent years, the liveliness of debate over socially-engaged art has less to do with the aesthetics and ethics of practice itself and more to do with the terms of criticism and policy to define it. Employing a range of social strategies to amplify broader political concerns, the field is distinguished by its artistic sensibility while encompassing a range of creative collaborations between artists and communities of both place and interest. Histories stem from a number of competing artistic and institutional motivations rooted in the geopolitical. For instance, American narratives stem from identity politics of the Harlem Renaissance, Second Wave Feminism, postwar New Deal with a focus on regionalism and the artistic practices of the Situationists, Fluxus and social sculpture.  Australian histories, meanwhile, are usually associated with the community arts movement that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s of workers theatre and children’s festivals, indigenous self determination, disability arts, the multicultural agenda alongside cultural development in local neighbourhoods.

Required Reading:

Danielle Wyatt, Marnie Badham, and Lachlan MacDowall (2015) “Vexing History: The Problem of Telling the Story of Community Arts in Australia” draft discussion paper

Gay Hawkins, From Nimbin to Mardi Gras: Constructing Community Arts (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993). Chapters 1 & 2, Chapter 6.

Lind, Maria. “Complications; On Collaboration, Agency and Contemporary Art.” Public: New Communities 39 (2009): 53-73.

Recommended Reading:

Lacy, Suzanne. “Debated Territory: Toward a Critical Language for Public Art.” Mapping the Terrain: New Genre Public Art. Ed. Suzanne Lacy. (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1995), 171-185.

Jackson, Shannon. “Quality Time: Social Practice Debates in Contemporary Art.” Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics. (London: Routledge. 2011), 54-86.

Week 3 – Histories of Help: Charity, settlement and missionary aesthetics

The 19th century settlement movement was an important precursor to the idea of community development in the British Empire. Shifting the model of charity from a distance, organisations like Toynbee Hall in the UK and Jane Addams’ Hull House in Chicago advocated for middle-class reformers to actually participate in the lives of migrants and the poor. Influenced by the ideas of culture as a civilising force espoused by Matthew Arnold, these activists played important roles in welfare reform and working class participation in democratic culture in the late 19th century, while sometimes maintaining paternalistic attitudes, dynamics of power that still circulate in art and community today.

Required Reading:

Jane Addams. “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements” (1892)

Diana Maltz, “Missionary Aestheticism as Emancipatory Aesthetics?” in British Aestheticism and the Urban Working Classes, 1870–1900.  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),  206-217

Tania Cañas, “10 Things You Need To Consider If You Are An Artist – Not Of The Refugee And Asylum Seeker Community – Looking To Work With Our Community.” http://riserefugee.org/10-things-you-need-to-consider-if-you-are-an-artist-not-of-the-refugee-and-asylum-seeker-community-looking-to-work-with-our-community/

Recommended Reading:

Grant Kester, “Aesthetic Evangelists: Conversion and Empowerment in Contemporary Art,” Afterimage 22:6 (January 1995), 5–11

Heather E. McLean,  “Cracks in the Creative City: The Contradictions of Community Arts Practice.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.6 (October 16, 2014): 2156-2173.

Week 4: Community as event: performance, action, happening

The technological developments of the industrial revolution reconfigured European communities through the abstraction of labour-power, loosening traditional values and establishing new systems of domination and affiliation, including the circulation of cultural goods. Some artists came to question the social values associated with art, seeing potential liberation to emerge from aesthetic experiences that focussed on the social effect of art rather than the object. Meanwhile, theatre developed a concern with the formal mechanics of the stage and the alienating effects of representation, to be either broken (Artaud) or ironically heightened (Brecht). These critical gestures open the dialectic of transgression characteristic of contemporary art, where non-art gestures in a community come to be understood within artistic frameworks, and art’s rituals bring affective significance to a secular society.

Required Reading:

Boal, Augusto. “A Theoretical Foundation.” The Aesthetics of the Oppressed. Trans. Adrian Jackson. (London; New York: Routledge, 2006). 11-43.

Recommended Reading:

Sell, Mike (1998) “The Avant-Garde of Absorption: Happenings, Fluxus, and the Performance Economies of the American Sixties”, Rethinking Marxism, 10.2 (1998): 1-26

Bishop, Claire. Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship. London: Verso 2012. Chapter Two: “The Historic Avant Garde”

Week 5: The Art of Politics

Unions played a key role in the development of infrastructure for health, education and culture outside of the upper classes. In the 20th century, through strike and petition, social reformers called upon the social democratic nation-state to adopt responsibility for this infrastructure, including the management of culture and cultural development. During the neoliberal era, corporatisation has produced new, internationalised flows of power and resistance, with renewed attention to the political force of the artistic activity.

Required Reading:

Ellen Feiss, “What is Useful? The paradox of rights in Tania Bruguera’s ‘Useful Art’” http://www.artandeducation.net/paper/what-is-useful-the-paradox-of-rights-in-tania-brugueras-useful-art/

Kelly, Owen. (1984). Community, Art, and the State: storming the citadels. London; New York, Comedia Publishing Group in association with Marion Boyars. Excerpts TBC.

Recommended Reading:

Gregory Sholette, excerpt from Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture, London: Pluto Press, 2011.

Mouffe, Chantal. “Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces.” Art & Research: A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods 1 .2 (2007)

Patricia C. Phillips,  “Creating Democracy: A Dialogue with Krzysztof Wodiczko.” Art Journal 62.4 (Winter 2003): 32-47.

Wallis, Brian, ed. Democracy: A Project by Group Material. Bay Press/Dia Art Foundation, 1990.

Week 6: Globality and Locality

The double bind of non-indigenous community is that the term “community” is by definition is imposed from elsewhere, bringing with it assumptions about the need for local change. Therefore, changes in the local cultural environment imply changes in the world, and vice-versa. In the West, the era of cultural nationalism has viewed internationalism through the labour movement and intergovernmental agencies such as UNESCO. Moving into the neoliberal era, new configurations of global movements are becoming palpable, enabled by new globe-girding technologies and discourses of decolonisation.

Required Reading:

Cuauhtémoc Medina, “Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses”, e-flux journal #12.

Lucy Lippard, The Lure of the Local: Senses of Place in a Multicentered Society (New York: The New Press, 1997). excerpts.

Recommended Reading:

Butt, Danny. “Local Knowledge: Place and New Media Practice.” Leonardo, 39.4 (August 2006): 323-326.

Week 7: Racism, rights, and community (19th April)

Through the 20th century the Western concept of culture came to be seen as no longer a tool of benevolence, but a powerful disciplining force that relied on the exclusion of non-white practitioners. Influenced by broader dialogues of decolonisation and resistance, the Black Arts and Multicultural arts movements posited cultural autonomy as something belonging to communities against the colonial state rather than being developed by the state.

Required Reading:

Paul Gilroy “Art of darkness: Black art and the problem of belonging to England”, Third Text, 4.10 (1990): 45-52.

Audre Lorde – “Poetry is not a luxury” (1977) In Women’s Voices, Feminist Visions: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Shaw, Susan M. and Janet Lee eds. 371-373.

Interview with Robin DiAngelo, “Why White People Freak Out When They’re Called Out About Race” <http://www.alternet.org/culture/why-white-people-freak-out-when-theyre-called-out-about-race>

Recommended Reading:

Walter Mignolo et. al, Decolonial Aesthetics <https://transnationaldecolonialinstitute.wordpress.com/decolonial-aesthetics/>

Week 8: Biopower: Art and institutional bodies

Michel Foucault saw an emergent politics in institutionalised technologies of human management: prison and clinic. These sites have also been sites of intervention by artists. How are bodies regulated, how does art ameliorate, support or challenge such regulation?

Required Reading:

Cheliotis, Leonidas “Decorative justice: deconstructing the relationship between the arts and imprisonment.” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 3.1: (2014): 16-34.

Week 9: Engendering community: feminist histories

Feminist movements attempted to displace the patriarchal ordering of society as public-political-male vs the private-ethical-female; and many saw in art a powerful vehicle to transform the personal into the political. This also made these movements a vibrant ground for debates on the limits of subjective affinity and white dominance. The uneasy conjuncture between intimate practices and political goals structures community-based movements toward inclusive gender and sexuality today.

Required Reading:

Martha Rosler, “Feminist Art in California,” Artforum, September 1977.

Vivien Green Fryd, “Suzanne Lacy’s Three Weeks in May: Feminist Activist Performance Art as ‘Expanded Public Pedagogy’” NWSA Journal 19.1, Spring (2007) 23-38

Mierle Laderman Ukeles, “Manifesto for Maintenance Art 1969 – Proposal for an exhibition “CARE”

Recommended Reading:

Sykes, Roberta. “Bobbi Sykes,” in Women who do and women who don’t join the women’s movement, ed. Robyn Rowland, (Melbourne: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 63-9. (Also, Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, same volume)

Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman, “Queer Nationality”  boundary 2, 19.1, (Spring, 1992), pp. 149-180

Week 10: The right to the city

Urbanisation is one of the dominant forces in society. In the west, artistic practices are almost always seen as emerging in an urban metropolis, given the task of humanising the abstract forces of capital-intensive infrastructure, and through gentrification contributing to its reformatting of human life. How has the city changed, what kinds of community have changed with it, and what is the role of the artist in reimagining the city?

Required Reading:

Tom Finklepearl. “Introduction: The City as Site.” Dialogues in Public Art. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001.

Josephine Berry, “Everyone is Not an Artist: Autonomous Art meets the Neoliberal City”

Recommended Reading:

Ivan Chtcheglov “Formulary for a New Urbanism” (1953)

Week 11: Environment and ecology

On the flipside of the conflation of the creative and the urban, a Romantic tradition has seen in nature the essence of beauty that could inform the production of art. Community arts has often worked to evade this dynamic, by seeking artistic outcomes in regional and rural environments that do not necessarily point back to the urban centre, or that engage environments for their intrinsic processes rather than simply as picturesque locations to be documented for an urban viewer. How have community-engaged arts tracked the discourses of the environmental movements?

Week 12: The Community and The Gallery: Critical Social Practices

In the 19th century it was assumed that art galleries could improve communities’ taste, and there were advocacy movements to make them open on Sundays when working class people could visit. Policies in the 1980s focused on a democratisation of the arts and to provide access to those experienced social or financial barriers to participating in the cultural life of their community; however, many of these policies overlooked how institutions maintain these cultural hierarchies. Today, the gallery is understood as both an economic sector and site of politics, and artistic attempts to bring other communities into the gallery are more likely to be understood as a critique.

Required Reading:

There is No Now Now reader. 2014. [Letters from Biennale of Sydney 19 Artists Working Group] January 29, 2014. <http://aaaaarg.org/thing/53489813334fe0078b2164d4>. Chapter One.

Fraser, Andrea. “A Museum Is Not a Business. It Is Run in a Businesslike Fashion”.” Art and Its Institutions: Current Conflicts, Critique and Collaborations, ed. Nina Möntmann. (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2006), 86-98

Recommended Reading:

Marina Vishmidt – “Mimesis of the Hardened and Alienated”: Social Practice as Business Model – e-flux 43 (2013) http://www.e-flux.com/journal/%E2%80%9Cmimesis-of-the-hardened-and-alienated%E2%80%9D-social-practice-as-business-model/

Stimson, B. “What Was Institutional Critique?” In Institutional Critique: An anthology of artists’ writings. A. Alberro & B. Stimson. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 20-42

Platforms and Public Participation

Platforms and public participation
Danny Butt, Scott McQuire and Nikos Papastergiadis
The concept of the ‘platform’ has recently received extensive analysis in media studies and urban planning. This paper explores the platform’s contemporary emergence as an expression of a new archival logic that questions the possibility of a democratic politics of participation. ‘Public participation’ in the platform invokes the individual in the form of a consumer with a profile rather than as a citizen of a state. This paper returns to Claudio Ciborra’s 1996 work on the ‘platform organization’ to diagnose a ‘re-architecting’
capability which we argue is integral to platform politics. Since this capacity for re-architecting is generally reserved from participants, we highlight the potential of ‘de-participation’ toward the emergence of counter-platforms.

Colonial Hospitality: Rethinking Curatorial and Artistic Responsibility

This piece co-authored with Local Time: “Colonial Hospitality: Rethinking Curatorial and Artistic Responsibility”, published in the Journal for Artistic Research 10 2016. Read on the JAR Website here.

Abstract: The recent enthusiasm for gestures of hospitality in contemporary art promises relief from the individualising forces of neoliberal capitalism and the professionalised hierarchies of the art world. Yet, Jacques Derrida describes the gesture of hospitality as paradoxically asserting a kind of sovereignty that underwrites the ‘right to host’, returning hospitality to the conditionality of the authorising institution. In settler-colonial territories, these institutionally underwritten gestures always sit uneasily atop indigenous sovereignties that have not been ceded, requiring the positive gestures of hospitality to remain open to their structuring fissures. This paper considers figurations of hospitality and responsibility in works by Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Raqs Media Collective in reading the art collective Local Time’s research-driven practice that seeks to reconcile indigenous self-determination and settler gestures of hospitality.

New International Information Order (NIIO) Revisited: Global Algorithmic Governance and Neocolonialism

Published in Fibreculture Journal Issue 27 –  Read on the Fibreculture website here.

Abstract: The field of Internet governance has been dominated by Euro-American actors and has largely resisted consideration of a holistic and integrative rights-based agenda, confining itself to narrow discussions on the technical stability of Internet Protocol resources and debates about nation-state involvement in multistakeholder governance of those resources. In light of the work of Edward Snowden documenting the close relationship between government security agencies and dominant social media platforms, this paper revisits the relevance of the New International Information Order (NIIO), a conceptualisation of the global politics of information described at the 1973 Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement of nations in Algiers. This paper argues that critical analysis of the oligopolistic structure of “platforms” and their algorithmic forms of governance can build a more inclusive movement toward social justice by extending the NIIO framework’s emphasis on decolonisation, collective ownership of strategic information resources, and documentation of powerful transnational entities.

Double-bound: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization.

Review essay to appear in RUPC Working Papers series, 2015. http://public-cultures.unimelb.edu.au/

Danny Butt, Research Fellow, Research Unit in Public Cultures, School of Culture and Communication, University of Melbourne. 1st June 2014. Revised 9th July 2014.

[PDF version available on the RUPC website here]

Abstract

Published in 2011, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization compiles and reconsiders two decades of her arguments about the political constitution of the aesthetic subject. This review essay traces arguments running through the book that reconcile the deconstructive politics of the subject with the resurgent interest in universalist theories that position themselves in relation to global technocapitalism. These arguments provide us with methodological tools for interrogating the “globalisability” of our academic work: the co-option of social movements and the need for epistemological care; Romantic techniques of self-othering toward new collectivities; Marx’s legacy of value as form; the powerful role of affect and habit in training the intellect; an expanded theory of reading; the limits of “culture” as a diagnostic; reproductive heteronormativity as a grounding principle; attention to intergenerational gendered structures of responsibility; and finally, a fully secularised understanding of radical alterity.

-*-

 

The university has always claimed to hold universal knowledge, but in the wake of postcolonial critique it is clearer to those who belong to university cultures that this knowledge been spatialised from Northwestern Europe onto the rest of the world. The rapid growth of the university in both scale and spread in the last half-century, its financialisation and reconfiguration as an education industry, and the networked information technologies that transport its knowledge have combined to provide new conditions for education’s “globalisability”, its potential synchronisation and distribution over the globe. How could we understand the situation of the “student” as a subject and object of this global circuit, in light of decreased public funding, massively increased participation, and chronic unemployment and underemployment among graduates? How is this linked to the aestheticisation of the economy, the growth of the art market and the art education market, and the valorisation of “creativity” by speculative capital? These questions formed part of a site-specific enquiry the artistic collective Local Time explored at St Paul Street, a university gallery in Auckland, New Zealand, through a 24-day reading group on Spivak’s imposing and exciting An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization (2011), which reconsiders two decades of Spivak’s arguments about the political constitution of the aesthetic subject.

Even after receiving the 2012 Kyoto prize for her decades of commitment to activism and teaching, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s name is still inevitably associated with her critique of Western theory’s effacement of its gendered others in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). The most visible cultural intermediaries today view these politics of subjective difference as historically noteworthy but ultimately stultifying and immobilising. The debates have been branded “identity politics” and archived into the 1980s, while “feminism” has been reconfigured as “gender”, the calculus of a new “global” politics of inclusion and democratisation, aligned with a missionary-style civil-society discourse that Spivak has termed “moral entrepreneurship.” Since then, Spivak has continued to interrogate the critical methods of the humanities to renovate their role in the emergent dynamic of the “contemporary”.

Spivak’s essays collected in the book diagnose two important challenges to those of us trying to think the broad conditions of aesthetic “globalisability”. Firstly, there is a class-division in who appropriates globality and who is subject to globalisation. In the visual arts, to take an example from my own field, biennialism has emerged as a globalised international circuit of cultural display, incorporating the former non-West as a site to stage its canon, reterritorialising local production with more or less criticality (but rarely engaging curatorial or theoretical agendas from the periphery), while largely disclaiming any responsibility to the broader political economy of these massive circuits of exchange. These colliding scales of politics are visible in various protests against the sponsorship of large scale international exhibitions, such as refugee detention centre operator Transfield Services’ sponsorship of the Biennale of Sydney in 2014. Secondly, global dynamics are not only experienced differently by women, but to consider that difference changes our perspective on the whole terrain of the global. In Spivak’s work, gender is important not simply as a political concern of inclusion, but as “our first instrument of abstraction” (Spivak 2011, p.30 – all future references are to this volume unless otherwise specified), our original way of understanding differentiation in the human, and she demonstrates how feminist analysis provides a continuing ground for the re-evaluation of our critical practices.

Spivak’s overarching themes in this volume revisit her 1999 Critique of Postcolonial Reason, which as the title suggests diagnosed in Immanuel Kant the philosophical rationale for the Enlightenment ideals of universal reason as the highest goal of education, and the accompanying moral valorisation of the aesthetic as a kind of “tuning” or programming of the human. In this analysis Kant is not a guarantor of any kind of truth in the university or in art, but hovers as an unavoidable “discursive precursor” for these questions, for our understanding of critique is “too thoroughly determined by [him] to be able to reject [him]” and thus the need to seek “a constructive rather than disabling complicity between our position and [his]” (Spivak 1999, p. 5-6). Contrary to the default political economy of contemporary Western globalisation as technological destiny, Spivak traced the uneven development of what Echeverría called the telepolis through the colonial imagination, and showed that Kant’s aesthetic theory was our best guide to the persistence of uneven “globalisability”, even more than his political writings. Kant carefully described a generic public version of the innocent Enlightenment subject who could make sense of the entire globe in their imagination: a default, immunised male citizen whose aesthetic sensibility would come to be seen as objective. We can think of this as a secularised Christian culture of modernist rational subjectivity. The supposed objectivity of this culture has not only been subjected to rigorous critique for its exclusions, but the very “force” of its objectivity seems to lack the aesthetic power to reshape the imagination as its classical university form attempted to. The challenge of reinvigorating or renovating this power in today’s corporate university system — without simply retrieving cultural institutions’ historical role as the producer of great men in the Western tradition — is an intractable question whose dimensions Spivak’s critique illuminates.

The “aesthetic” in Kant’s account is not a simple thing, but “a sort of ambivalent refuge” between the creative flourishing of nature and the stern logic of philosophical reason that constitutes humanity (p.24). Spivak adopts Bateson’s description of the “double-bind” as a generalisable description of the type of tension between the vital and the institutional (or body and mind) that Kant tries to make sense of. Spivak’s title makes explicit reference to the work of one of Kant’s contemporaries, Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, which attempted to “revalorise” the aesthetic, proposing the drive for play as not so much a solution to Kant’s difficulties but as a force of power that should “naturally” overcome them. And who would not side with the positivity of creativity as a human capacity, after all, over the interminable and somewhat turgid prose of the philosopher? However, if we turn our attention to the use-value of creativity today, the operation of terms such as “creative city” or the “creative industries” demonstrates that even if one promotes “creativity for all”, not everyone’s creativity is equally valorised. Creativity and innovation become rationales for large-scale downsizing of firms, privatisation of public assets and the evacuation of the poor from gentrifying neighbourhoods.

Schiller had the right idea — an aesthetic education to educate the intuition of the public sphere — but he thought that to do this he must forget Kant’s injunction that the imagination cannot be accessed directly. In this suppressing the conceptual in favour of the pragmatic, Schiller falls prey to another kind of idealism. The Kantian figuring of the aesthetic as a double-bind between a creative natural force and a structuring social order could productively be read as a crisis in that logic. It allows the critical to jam the cogs of productivity that we internalise through neoliberal subjectivity, which lead to the habit of seeing other people as mere resources for our own creative expression. In an “ironic affirmation” of Schiller’s impulse [“Schiller was indeed wrong […] but who is exactly right?” (p.28)], Spivak’s goal here is to both theorise and demonstrate the possibility that an aesthetic education as the “training of the imagination for epistemological performance” allows us to think the double bind of the political and the ethical.

Without attempting the impossible task of addressing all that the book has to offer, I want to track a few issues running through it that reconcile the deconstructive politics of the subject with the resurgent interest in universalist theories that position themselves in relation to global techno-capital. I inhabit the exegetical mode in this paper altogether more than I would like, but few authors compress more into a sentence than Spivak. The intention, however, is less to explain than to sift out methodological tools for interrogating the “globalisability” of our own work: the co-option of social movements and the need for epistemological care; Romantic techniques of self-othering toward new collectivities; Marx’s legacy of value as form; the powerful role of affect and habit in training the intellect; an expanded theory of reading; the limits of “culture” as a diagnostic; reproductive heteronormativity as a grounding social principle; attention to intergenerational gendered structures of responsibility; and finally, a fully secularised understanding of radical alterity. I also hope, most of all, to encourage the new reader to take their own journey through the twenty five chapters themselves.

Spivak opens by stating that “Globalisation takes place only in capital and data. Everything else is damage control” (p.1). Not only are we not ourselves global, the study of global movements cannot meet its object on the same scale, as we are always located in a perspective. In the broad terrain of the humanities, arts and social sciences, we must be able to think the double-bind that programs our access to the global in its specificity. No universality for the university, then, but this does not mean that the university is useless. Our ability to influence global forces relies upon our skill in reading the specificity of our situation and through writing and teaching in the academy and outside we present that possibility for others to share. But one does not play the political game by writing about it, claims Spivak, and she stages this distinction relentlessly, reminding us that the classroom is the truest test for theory’s “application”: theory is applied in the remaking of a self. Her well-known formula for the practice of humanities teaching is “the uncoercive rearrangement of desire”, and her commitment to this principle is evident in her invitation for us to follow her through her material, without seeking the shortest distance between two politically correct points. Spivak argues that it is by learning to learn how to read the specific idiom of another’s practice that one learns the possibility of un-coerced change, and therefore Spivak will not let us position her as the source of a critical method, but presents herself as an example. We should learn our methods from the world with no guarantees, learning to learn from the “singular and unverifiable” (p. 2). Spivak revisits Romanticism as the European tradition that opens this possibility.

 

Romanticism revisited

Spivak’s opening concern is the relation between education and habit. Bateson describes habit as the interconnection of feedback loops for solving classes of problems in the “hard programming” of the unconscious (p.5). Under capitalism, our desire to accrue profitable information habituates us into immunity to the desires of others, an ethical deficit that leads to the destruction of social infrastructure. To escape or transform these habits in either the other or the self is no easy task, as shifting the habit of thinking still does not reach the imagination’s will to shift habit directly. The aesthetic is a powerful tool here, as it “short-circuits the task of shaking up this habit of not examining [the premises of habit], perhaps” (p.6). Spivak looks to the literary canon to show that we too can still learn by the terms of the “noble failed experiment” of Romanticism, which was attempting to respond to a political-economic conjuncture somewhat like our own (p.112). She understands the texts of Shelley, Wordsworth and Coleridge as wanting a society where “the imagination, which is our inbuilt capacity to other ourselves, can lead perhaps to understanding other people from the inside, so that the project [of the Industrial Revolution] would not be a complete devastation of the polity and of society through a mania for self-enrichment” (p.111).” Interestingly, Spivak believes that this type of aesthetic pedagogy toward an ethical relationship to others is still being thought through the visual arts, whereas poetry itself has become a “sort of narcissism”:

I am constantly asked to help curators launch shows in museums where they invite the street in and make the barrio (or Brick Lane) into a show. It is exactly like the earlier attempt—except somewhat less well-theorized than Wordsworth’s and Shelley’s belief that you could with poetry exercise the imagination, train in ethics (“public taste”)—in the othering of the self and coming as close as possible to accessing the other as the self. (p. 113)

The Romantic project, in today’s gallery, remains accessible only to a certain class which habitually fails to judge the felicity of its own political-economic inheritance as the subject of history. This has always been the case in Romanticism: “William Wordsworth’s project is deeply class-marked, […] he does not judge habit. He is clear about being superior to others in being a poet, unusually gifted with a too-strong imagination, capable of organizing other people’s habits.” (p. 6) We know that the simple figuring of the democratic in the gallery might be an initial provocation to think of a future world, but will not bring that world about. To shift habit requires the institutionalisation and instrumentalisation of the artist/intellectual, or more accurately an ability to recognise how the intellectual is already institutionalised in our own political-economic conjuncture, as Gramsci has it. The importance of an aesthetic education lies in training of the imagination of the progressive bourgeoisie to understand this gap between formal figure and political structure, “to realize that ‘social movements’ are co-opted by state and elite, with different agendas, ceaselessly” (p. 519). Merely enacting the appearance of democracy or depicting its emergence or decline at a sociological level, in the manner of much “relational” art, not only fails to achieve its aims, but may even insulate artist and audience from engaging with the “real involvement in infrastructure” (p. 112-113) that would bring state democratisation about, particularly in the parts of the world which supply the cultural elite with labour and resources that underpin “creative practices”. Spivak here turns to Marx as a writer who has allowed us to think labour and infrastructure as a system.

 

Marx’s value as form

The blueprint for Spivak’s aspirations of an aesthetic education are found in Marx’s Capital, where he seeks to recode the factory worker from victim of capitalism to the “agent of production”; that is, to encourage the worker to see that their own labour can be conceived in the form capitalism calls “value”. Spivak is insistent that for Marx the value-form is a formal concept, something “contentless and simple” that cannot be arrived at through tallying such and such amount of exchange-value. As form, value asks for figuration and disfiguration rather than empirical documentation. It is an aesthetic question. For Marx the value-form of labour is a specific form of validation of labour by capital that could be levered by workers to organise production for social ends rather than toward capitalist accumulation.

In “Supplementing Marxism”, Spivak notes that there are two ideas of the social in Marx: firstly, the appropriation of capital for “social” productivity; and secondly, the public use of reason toward “social” good. Marx did not theorise the post-revolutionary subject who could enact this second kind of social, and for Spivak this is why transformation of economic management toward socialism has not inevitably resulted in freedom for the unprepared working class subject. Marx’s oversight also limits the kinds of revolutionary subjects that can be thought, as Marx and Engels’ empirical assumptions about the subject were based on the default of colonial Europe, resulting in frames such as the Asiatic Mode of Production as an inevitably Eurocentric account of pre-industrialism that has limited leverage in the very social formations it sought to describe. Social movements, following Marx and Engels in failing to theorise the possibility of subjective development through difference (i.e. lacking of a theory of learning), have thus at various points fallen into totalitarianism in the name of freedom.

Spivak reworks Marx’s “moral and psychological” efforts to think social freedom as “epistemological,” drawing on Gramsci’s detailed analysis of the relationship between class formation and subjectivation to show how these two forms of the social allow an aesthetic education to be thought in Marx’s framework. For Gramsci, intellectual production is situated not only within a political superstructure atop an economic base, but also within epistemological (meta-psychological) constraints on engaging across differences within society. Education toward freedom can only emerge when one can abstract one’s own experience in order to connect it with others, and thus to work together on a shared political struggle. For Gramsci, intellectuals are always “organic”, affectively connected to the part of the social body they seek to change. The “organic intellectual” has been valorised by cultural studies as a figure of moral approval, but for Gramsci and Spivak this organic connection was not something one could want, it simply is. What Spivak sees as necessary is not simply consciousness-raising, today led by the “corporate-funded feudality of the digitally confident alterglobalists” (p. 26), but “patient epistemological care” (p. 519 n57) that can train the imagination to reimagine a specific situation.

 

Reading in the expanded field

Spivak’s interest is in the textual nature of this “organic” connection, which can be figured in the literary terms metonymy and synecdoche (p. 436). Her basic principle for social action is the ability to see another’s position as potentially substitutable for one’s own in the script of life: metonymy. Then, through synecdoche, a part of oneself that can identify as a member of a collective supports collective action as if their full interests were represented by this collective (of citizens, workers, or women, or any group organising for political ends). Meanwhile, the subjective part of oneself which does not fit the category is privatised or de-prioritised in the interests of collective action. Political action thus involves a necessary fiction. An aesthetic education expands both the range of scripts one’s self can be metonymically inserted into, as well as multiplying the concepts one can use to self-synechdocise. However, the success of this alignment of self and collective context relies on skill in tracing the weave of forces that shape the public and private parts of political change. This skill is not generic information processing in any “natural” psuedo-biological cognitive sense, but a subtly textured cluster of aesthetic identifications and analysis practiced at the limits of one’s default subjective formation. It is a skill we can call “reading”, practised with the imagination.

Central to Spivak’s argument throughout the book is a theory of reading in the broad sense, literary reading in particular. In alignment with Derrida, Spivak views reading and writing as terms that can be used for the operation of sign and trace across all media, oral, alphabetic, audio-visual, biological: production and reproduction. For Spivak, the term ‘writing’ describes “a place where the absence of the weaver from the web is structurally necessary” (p. 58). Writing is a trace that is heterogeneous to the authorial self. Reading is the mode where we take up the anonymous written inscriptions left by others in that web and make them our own. Reading is where we make ourselves. In the aesthetic lineage from Kant that splits the writing and reading functions inside the individual, writers are also paradoxically their own first readers. Again, the argument holds across all forms of signification – including the visual, even though here, “in the visual, the lesson of reading is the toughest. There are no guarantees at all” (p.507). The artist does not simply “express” a vitalist force of creativity, but develops a never-achieved reflexive capacity to read one’s own traces as others see them, and to adjust their modes of trace-making in turn. It is a profoundly ethical relationship grounded in the social world.

Moving culture

The multicultural agenda in criticism is popularly understood as integrating and including people of colour in the canon. Spivak does not disavow the value of diversity but does not think that this is a sufficient goal. She teaches a precisely British heritage of criticism to channel her North American students into “thinking the other through idiomaticity”, because English is the only language in which they are “responsible”. Within this language they “cannot help believing that history happened in order to produce them”(p. 116). Their mindset of dominance will not be shaken simply by the benevolent appropriation of translated multicultural literatures into the canon, because the “legitimising codes” of nationalism, internationalism, secularism, and culturalism that underpin the literatures of decolonisation in English are class-divided (p. 57). That class division is inaccessible to the native English reader.

In the chapter “How to Read a ‘Culturally Different’ Book” Spivak is anxious to demonstrate that nothing in her argument prevents the metropolitan teacher from teaching a book across gender, ethnic, and class divisions. In the era of “globalisability”, this teaching across such intractable lines is even more imperative. An ability to read across these divides and thus to teach and learn is the best outcome of an aesthetic education. Under globalisation, a neoliberal political rationality tracks the flows of finance capital, graphing local genres of political agency into data, repackaging social action as tightly policed modes of productivity. This graphing must be undone to engage ethically with other humans, but, as Spivak cautions, one cannot undo the divisions by immediately reaching for the other side of cultural divides in the ethnographic mode, for “in order to do distant reading one must be an excellent close reader” (p. 443). One must enter the text of another’s world, and Spivak suggests that the intellectual can only provide tactical, rather than strategic support to subaltern movements without flattening the unseen differences that are the engine of these movements.

Differential subjectivity must then be attended to as an impossible task. The ethical relation of deconstruction is not a solution to the political-economic problem of subalternity, but a motor that can drive our imagination ever closer to the asymptotic figure of the other, as part of our preparation for political action. Through this training of the imagination, we can learn to perform within the episteme of another person. This is not just an anthropological exercise of language learning for data extraction to publish “back home” in the academy. Spivak cautions us that that one never reaches the subaltern other until one has an intimate understanding of the mother tongue of the subject/object of study, at which point they can no longer be treated as an object in quite the same way. One’s own ability to be transformed to accept and affect the structure of responsibility inhabited by the other remains the critical question: how can one approach responsibility to the other so that rather than pretending to be an innocent observer in the “research” mode, one’s productive capability can be made available to operate in a radically different context, where our own makeup must be provisionally set aside even as it is never rescinded? This is Marx’s question of social productivity through the imagination of the value-form thought in the ethical. Yet this otherness never resolves into “culture.” Spivak suggests we need to explore the cultural difference closer to home:

“We must investigate and imaginatively constitute our “own” unclaimed history with the same teleopoietic delicacy that we strive for in the case of the apparently distant. The most proximate is the most distant, as you will see if you try to grab it exactly, in words, or, better yet, to make someone else grab it.” (p. 406)

In the chapter “Culture: Situating Feminism”, Spivak gives a brilliant potted definition of the term culture, noting that this anthropological description for the collective human Other has become shorthand for the distinction between the sacred and the profane and the relationship between the sexes. But no equivalent term exists in non-European languages. Ironically, then, the European term culture allows us to remain aloof from the intra-cultural distinctions of sacredness and profanity, or relations between the sexes in different times and places, yet it is the ability to read these intra-cultural distinctions that is required to escape Eurocentrism in humanist thought in non-European settings. The problem with “culture” as explanation is not that it is too abstract a term, but that it emerges from a Eurocentric “culture of no culture”, which is unable to theorise its own distinctions as particular rather than universal. As Spivak has noted previously, this is “not so much a universalisation as seeing one history as the inevitable telos as well as the inevitable origin and past of all men and women everywhere” (Spivak and Sharpe 2002, p. 617). Therefore, for Spivak, it is imperative that the institutions of culture “precomprehend their instituting culture” (p.161) before producing cultural explanations that marginalise others. “Culture” for Spivak appears as a middle-class term, doing explanatory work only at a safe distance from the ethical relation of genuine engagement across difference, and the economic torque exerted by capital. Other people’s “cultural” defaults are viewed as external to one’s own tolerance, and the researcher of culture’s assumptions are unmodifiable by the answers.

For the benevolent Romantic seeking to save the world, the figure of the gendered subaltern (in, for example, the “global South”) remains inaccessible to political thought and action unless the heterogeneity of the subaltern’s context can be imagined across the gap separating the intellectual and the subaltern. Culture does not help us here. It is at the very basis of the human as a developmental social being that the structure of this imagination can be thought.

 

Reproductive heteronormativity and subjective development

Spivak’s most arresting move in the book is to situate Marx’s untheorised process of subjective social development in a default category of reproductive heteronormativity (RHN). Spivak believes this must be thought in order to convincingly theorise human action, and psychoanalysis and feminist work are the main fields that have undertaken that labour. Expressing suspicion of European psychoanalytic theory for its universalism, Spivak nevertheless sees in feminist psychoanalysis a technical process of subject formation that allows the development of responsibility to others to be understood.

Drawing on Melanie Klein, Spivak describes how the human is born into a structure of timing and spacing “written” by the mother. (Again, we must hold onto the broad sense of “writing” that exceeds the alphabetic). The development of subjective interiority proceeds through a grabbing “of an outside indistinguishable from an inside [which then] constitutes an inside, fit to negotiate with an outside, going back and forth and coding everything into a sign-system by the thing(s) grasped” (p. 241). This relation between interior and exterior worlds invented and expressed by the creative infant emerges through idiomatic forms of para-linguistic timing and spacing. Spivak suggests that this development of formal exteriority is then translated into the structural (patriarchal) language of the mother tongue by the parent (and media-substitutes), training the infant in appropriate speech, even as the child consistently exceeds identifiable structures of language or “culture.” “It is in this sense that the human infant, on the cusp of the natural and the cultural, is in translation, except the word “translation” loses its dictionary sense right there” (p. 243). The human is born into a para-psychological “structure of responsibility” which trains the imagination for epistemological performance (aesthetic education), yet also establishes both paternal and maternal “writing” of the child in distinction to each other, bringing the constant presence of otherness.

Spivak’s account of the grabbing impulse is particularly distinctive when compared to neo-vitalist philosophies of emergence. For Spivak, the grabbing impulse emerges from the fundamental gap between what we need and what we can make, a lack that we actively seek to close through the “creative”. This gap for Spivak is a byproduct of reproductive heteronormativity, which mandates that reproduction of oneself is impossible, and so “to be born human is to be born angled toward an other and others” (p.99) — she notes here that the antonym of hetero– is not homo– but auto-. The gap between what one needs (in a form handed down from the past) and what one can make is “filled by neither reason nor unreason yet seems irreducible” (p. 457). Because capital is a form of writing, it can fill the gap with its formulaic programming of commodities. However, literary training can diversify what occupies this gap, to escape the default scripts of capital that aim to make us want the information-rich commodity as the gap-filler nearest to hand.

 

Experiencing radical alterity

The poetic function, in principle, exceeds the individual, therefore it can contribute to the task of reminding us that our desires are not naturally beneficient. In Spivak’s view we must be able to imagine a singular other metonymically, with oneself in that particular place, in order to orientate oneself toward “others” in a larger public. This is where the ethical potential of Romanticism lies: in order to think the other one must be able to imagine oneself as other. The kind of alterity Spivak is thinking is not located in the individual or their culture, but is the opening to the ethical as such, and in the Romantic tradition the development of the capability to genuinely engage the other will start “at home” in the othering of the self. Once again the visual mode seems important to this opening: “radical alterity must be thought and must be thought through imaging” (p.97). In the chapter “Imperative to Re-Imagine the Planet” radical alterity takes on many names: “Mother, Nation, God, Nature” (p. 178) — Spivak notes that some of these names are more radical than others. There is nothing particularly mystical about Spivak’s version of radical alterity, except that one’s own versions of it are not easily thinkable, as they are a name for the ground of thinking as such: “mysterious and discontinuous — an experience of the impossible” (p. 341). However difficult to mobilise, alterity functions as a check on captial’s reproduction of the same. Without the aesthetic education that allows one to metonymise and synecdochise oneself, conflicting versions of radical alterity, such as religious conflicts, appear as irreconciliable differences between clans. By default, the different versions of alterity held by a person belonging to another clan are removed from one’s structure of responsibility, and inhuman acts are thus justified by the Other’s predetermined difference. Enlightened Western secularism is far from immune from this problematic, as it still figures this responsibility through a named Christian-heritage grounding, most commonly “science”, while Spivak is adamant that all such grounds must be dislodged in order to think other forms. Seeing other versions of radical alterity as potentially substitutable for one’s own through the shared logic of reproductive heteronormativity becomes a critical safeguard against both benevolent neocolonialism and culturalism.

Spivak seeks not to merely describe this possibility but to demonstrate it. She finds her most useful way to think radical alterity in the Muslim concept-metaphor of the haq, “the birthright of being able to take care of other people” (p. 294). Without the grounding of haq-like responsibility, and thus to the precomprehension of an instituting culture to the political, the subaltern other remains buried under the “repetitive negotiations” of neocolonial benevolence. “The subjunctive can move to an imperative only in terms of that responsibility-as-right fixed by a truth-in-alterity collective structure that happened to have been conceptualized as haq” (p. 345). Related structures of responsibility to the planet and people operate in many pre-capitalist high cultures, but Spivak appears to find the haq most useful precisely because it is not “native” to her subject position, yet is connected to the monotheistic tradition that came to structure many political forms of the contemporary world we in the West inherit.

Consistent with her earlier-described decision to teach British Romanticism rather than multicultural literatures in English-language translation, Spivak here seems to be trying to escape the benevolent leftist’s “decolonising” agenda of appropriating indigenous cultural forms as political models, when clearly the literary critic is not themselves subject to the responsibility to the “eco-biomes” or ecological worlds that maintain those models. Characteristically, it is in her discussion of responsibility that Spivak’s own critical responsibility is most performatively evident. For many years Spivak refused to discuss her teacher-training efforts in Bengal – in 2002 she noted that “if I talk about these places, first of all, I think I would get the kind of approval from your readership which I would much rather earn because of my theoretical work. You know, there is a certain kind of benevolent approval which I really resist” (Spivak and Sharpe 2002 p. 623). It is interesting that her recent willingness to talk through this work coincides with her adoption of the non-indigenous concept-metaphor of the haq to think radical alterity. Spivak has also commented that she started to talk about her Bengal schools once they were doing things by themselves, a conjuncture that links institutional and theoretical autonomy in realpolitik. The negotiation with one’s own ethics of representation will be poignant to anyone attempting to “learn from below” from subaltern worlds, where the gap between playing the game and writing about it is always vividly on display.

-*-

An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization is a big, unruly book — at a recent conference Spivak joked that as a classroom teacher, she has trouble saying anything in less than fourteen weeks. Although many pieces here are previously published, Spivak the responsible pedagogue repeatedly chastises her prior naiveté or notes a change in the structure of her thinking in acerbic annotations throughout. Spivak is “famously difficult”, not simply due to an attraction to the counter-intuitive, but because her work is constantly surfacing the supports of her theoretical platform. The key to reading Spivak in the face of this “over-readability”, as Bal (2000) explained, is tuning in to her teacherly voice. The theoretical moves in her books come directly from the experience of the classroom, the site where any academic project must find its ultimate effect. Like any class that transforms one’s thinking, it resists attempts to grasp it in advance, but asks us to submit to the text over time rather than to attempt to master it through pop summary. Such responsibility to the site of teaching is inconvenient for the writer rushing toward the more properly ‘urgent’ political manifestations of the global, but for Spivak all theoretical labor is “destined for errancy” (p.28) in the political realm.

Reading An Aesthetic Education for a month inside a gallery with a reading group of artists and critics, many were struck by Spivak’s feral indifference to professionalised forms of theoretical discourse. The questions of form in Spivak’s writing also came to the fore – her dazzling, compressed figures (key example: her discussion of “originary” identity claims in the negative, as “like the clutch disengaging to get a stick- shift car moving” (p. 426)) and her striking manipulation of the temporality of reading. Spivak’s resolute literality in the reading of texts brings to mind a characteristic mode of contemporary time-based art, that of diegesis, the experience of being held through narration of a particular time and place, suspending philosophical detachment while nevertheless remaining aware of the lineaments left by historical genres. “What if there is only a vulgar concept of time?” asks Derrida in a formulation Spivak has pointed to more than once. Forging a practice in the thickness of vulgar time would not come from a mastery of global time but through experience gained in a variety of local times. Spivak’s inspirational commitment to gaining fluency in these temporalities, documenting their resistance to synchronisation at the hands of capital and data, is perhaps an aesthetic education that any artist could endorse.

 

Acknowledgements: For their contribution to this article I’d like to acknowledge the participants in Local Time’s reading group on An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization. For comments on earlier drafts I thank Alex Monteith, Natalie Robertson, Jon Bywater, Ruth DeSouza and Nikos Papastergiadis – all errors are of course my own.

 

References

Bal, M. (2000). Three-Way Misreading. Diacritics, 30 (1), 2-24.

Spivak, G. C. (1999). A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward A History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Spivak, G. C. (2011). An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Spivak, G. C., & Sharpe, J. (2002). A conversation with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Politics and the Imagination. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(2), 609-625.

 

Danny Butt <https://dannybutt.net> is Research Fellow in the Research Unit in Public Cultures at the University of Melbourne. He is the editor of PLACE: Local Knowledge and New Media Practice (with Jon Bywater and Nova Paul) (Cambridge Scholars Press 2008) and Internet Governance: Asia Pacific Perspectives (Elsevier 2006).  He works with the art collective Local Time <http://www.local-time.net>, most recently in the exhibitions Spectres of Evaluation (Footscray, 2014), If you were to live here… The 5th Auckland Triennial (Auckland, 2013) and Sarai Reader 09 (Delhi, 2013)

 

Born in Flames: an Aesthetic Education

The grounding narrative of politicization for the people my teenage self wanted to become looked back to Paris, May 1968. Uncompromising refusal, collective action and the aesthetics of the street made the Situationist International a privileged model for political activity in experimental arts and punk rock circles. Zine culture brought the Situationists to the decidedly un-French environs of Newcastle, Australia, the steel and coal port where I was born, a city which also happens to be the birthplace of New York SI-scholar McKenzie Wark, who I later sought out for supervision of my masters degree. But rather than being a cosmopolitan capital of a European republic and progenitor of modern democracy like Paris, regional Australia was a barely-reformed penal colony whose potential liberation seemed somewhat less exciting or consequential. When Newcastle’s most famous riot at the Star Hotel made it to the French media in 1979, the reported headline captured it perfectly: “Australians riot when pub closes.” It’s true that the Star would have been a place I would have hung out if I were 18 rather than 8 years’ old at the time, but a historical clash between police and 4000 drunk youth in a working class city never gained artistic currency in my world, which did not hold Cold Chisel’s commemorative track dear, and it certainly held no promise of a political future.

Before the arrival of the web, my all-consuming activity was mail-ordering books, magazines, LPs and cassettes that could connect me to the artists and musicians I admired, most of whom were from New York or New Zealand. I remember the availability of NTSC VHS players in Australia finally making available videos of independent 80s bands and indie films, and among one of those packages a copy of Lizzie Bordern’s 1983 film Born in Flames made it to my collection. I’d been hanging out on the fringes of feminist politics on campus while dropping out of my sociology degree, attracted by the potential exit from the compulsory heterosexuality I’d grown up with, while intimidated by the intractability of what Gayatri Spivak describes as the “simple and forbidding” double-binds of gender. Born in Flames demonstrated a possibility of bonding in difference, not just in the theoretical manner I would come to understand later, but through aesthetic action that seemed to present itself immediately. The world that created the film seemed more inviting than the prospect of being excommunicated from the radical sects of manguardists who dominated the local political scene. I’d like to say I took the film to heart then, but lacking a community to process it with I only watched it once or twice before it sat in the archives, and it was only much later that I realized how deeply the film had perhaps touched my aspirations for the political.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hrCEbzr_TAU&list=PLtU6nY4ULwowLu5BBOLVspJVh2ednwBAM&index=6&ab_channel=MIFF

For the uninitiated, Born in Flames is a neo-realist feminist “sci-fi” set in a future New York that looks a lot like 1983 but for one detail: it is a nominal ten years after a socialist revolution. In the film, mass media channels reframe the continuing oppression of women and black people as a lingering glitch in the system still promising “freedom for all.” Various groups of women, most prominently black and working-class lesbians, organize to demand economic, political and sexual justice through strikes and direct action. Male government figures graph the activity of the militant Women’s Army, but the intelligence-gathering is constantly rebuffed by the Army’s apparent lack of hierarchical leadership. The activist women, however, are not disaggregated merely as a strategy; they also negotiate very real fractures between their own groups along race and class lines. The white middle-class women who edit the Socialist Youth Review are initially disdainful of the black-led Army, which they perceive as a dangerous rupture of a united socialist front toward equality for women. Meanwhile, the white anarchist punk rockers represented by Isabel (played by Adele Bertei of The Contortions, possibly the connection that led me to first see the film) appear to be more simply not very good at fitting in with anyone else’s plans.

Things get serious when Women’s Army leader Adelaide Norris dies in custody after being abducted by government men upon her return from a training exercise with a revolutionary African women’s militia in the West Sahara. The resulting ferment produces an ethical irruption for the white newspaper editors, who finally loosen their attachment to institutional control and “class guilt” to join the black-led collective struggle. The white women realize that if they too refused to wait indefinitely for a future justice promised by the male leaders, they would also be on the receiving end of the same state violence. Their class position, theoretical orientation and professional location still determine their mode of political action: they do not adopt the black women’s praxis through the simplistic assumption of downward mobility. Exposed to critique, however, they learn to read Norris’ struggle as their own. Meanwhile, the white punks learn to understand the collective structure of their plight through more banal and proximate acts of violence: bombings of the rival pirate radio stations highlight the inadequacy of their aesthetic rebellion in the face of fascism.  These diverse women join to shakily bear arms and hi-jack a presidential television address, broadcasting a taped message from senior black leader Zella, condemning the oppression of women everywhere. They finally destroy the patriarchal media organ by bombing the television antenna atop the World Trade Centre in the film’s infamous and prescient ending.

The centrality of the film in my political imaginary became clearer while reading Spivak’s 2012 opus, An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization. While Spivak’s tone differs markedly from Bordern’s, she shares a goal to read the political through the ethical, to maintain the intuition of transcendental collectivity without suppressing the intractable boundaries of race, gender and class that govern our ability to join collective action. Spivak’s overarching concern in the book is with the possibility of the aesthetic to “short-circuit the task of shaking up our habit of not examining our habits, perhaps.” In this formulation we already have a classic Spivak speed-bump: it will not be as simple as learning to change our habits (through e.g. following new rules); the best we might politically achieve from the aesthetic is learning to stop forgetting we have habits.  “Theory brings practice to crisis [perhaps making practice more ready for the aesthetic ‘shake up’], and practice norms theory.” Following Gramsci, Spivak holds the institutional location of the specific intellectual as central to the political effects of their work: knowing the rules of the game is one thing, but being able to play all the roles in the game is another. Real collectivity is a patient process of learning to listen to those on the other side, but which other sides and where is each practitioner’s own political calculation.

Bordern has said that one of her motivations for making Born in Flames was to create “a process whereby I could release myself from my own bondage in terms of class and race”, exorcising “whatever discomfort I might have felt as a white filmmaker working with black women.” Bordern’s language of the “process” recognizes the double-bind of the political in the personal: in Spivak’s terms she must “learn how to learn” this release from race and class bondage. The impossible “release” Bordern sought could not be reached directly in the single-bind of expert attempts at “anti-racism” or class analysis. Instead, Bordern as artist-intellectual must discover the larger currents she can give herself over to that will carry her where she needs to go, a destination unknown at the outset. Bordern learns to form a cross-racial political alliance not through simply reading political currents, but reading them in preparation for doing them — a doing that is outside the script, in the broader institutional film-making milieu where Bordern locates herself in order to author her work. Similarly, within the narrative of the film, the process of political coming together for the white women is based not on logical or convergent arguments about political organization, but through an “othering of the self” that Spivak locates in the Romantic tradition, staged most strikingly by Isabel’s idiomatic experimentation with performing black music, wearing cornrows and wearing a kufyia. As always, appropriation is endemic to white “creativity”. But through this appropriation the white performer, by learning how to read and perform cultural differences in their idiomaticity, prepares herself in the film to understand how her own oppression connects to genres of life other than her default. The film seems to concur with Spivak that the impulse to “learn from below” across class and racial divides (or, in my case of writing on the film, gender divides) does not allow the certainty of political correctness. As with all aesthetic endeavours, the use-value of this engagement will only be evaluated after the fact, by the critical reader, rather than the producer, in the reader’s own scene of action.

The supplementation of political ends with ethical means that Bordern and Spivak explore is an endless and gendered task, and the film’s narrative reflects a utopian feminist narrative of interpersonal alliances that remain radically open to differently constituted subjects. Theresa de Lauretis diagnosed the audience of Born in Flames as womanhood multiplied and diffracted, where women are “addressed intermittently and only insofar as we are able to occupy the position of addressee.” In a key scene in the film, Phoenix Radio DJ Honey makes a stirring on-air call: “Black women, be ready. White women, get ready. Red women, stay ready, for this is our time and all must realize it.”  As de Lauretis asks, “which individual member of the audience, male or female, can feel singly interpellated as spectator-subject or, in other words, unequivocally addressed?” Bordern’s film asks the viewer to reflexively consider what de Lauretis describes as “the contradiction of my own history and the personal/political difference within myself.” This double-bind can only be escaped through the setting to work of the contradictions through collective action with others yet to come.

De Lauretis located a certain negativity at the heart of the enterprise of women’s cinema, working toward a “deaestheticization of the female body, the desexualization of violence, the deoedipalization of narrative, and so forth.” To mistake this as a simple gesture of refusal would be to forget the double-bind: it is more a specifically shaped negative space than an open horizon of nothingness. In Spivak’s book, mindfulness of the double-bind protects the ethical reflex from co-option as a universal program, reminding us that all moves to freedom have a place of departure. She captures this in her ingenious figuring of the “originary” move in identity claims as being “like the clutch disengaging to get a stick-shift car moving.” The adoption of a collective historical identity – essentialism strategic or otherwise – is here an attempt to to drop out of a specific contemporary gear (neoliberalism, patriarchy, compulsory heterosexuality, etc). This perhaps relates to Derrida’s suggestion that democracy opens public space by “granting the right to a change in tone.” In Born in Flames certain identifiable political “positions” are represented, but through the film they are escaped, folded onto themselves, interrupted and pulled apart so that genres yet to come reveal themselves in between the stances taken by the diverse cast. Bordern: “Everyone knows nothing will work. But even if the questions are old, they must be renewed to mean something different today.”

“Everyone knows nothing will work” – Guy Debord would have heard that as defeatist, these politics of subjective difference lacking the unitary theory that gave his narrative of May 1968 its broad appeal. But in contemporary intellectual and artistic communities, navigating the diversity of both means and ends is the norm, which vanguardists forget at their peril. As performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña put it in his reflections on collective action with Border Arts Workshop, “we were not able to erase the borders among ourselves, the very same borders we were attempting to erase in the larger society, so we succumbed to our own racism, our own sexism, our own cultural prejudice, our own fears and desires. […] We were devoured by our own chimeras and grandiose ideas. And as you know, this has happened to so many collectives…” Perhaps this is why thirty years ago Spivak considered Berkeley 1967 to “make more sense” than May 1968 as a grounding scene of action in the “more racially ethnically, historically, more heterogeneous” United States. Born in Flames adopts this fractured ground to think its utopia, showing that neither papering over the fissures nor postponing their repair until after the revolution will work. The film stands as an inspirational example of how the assumptions of white patriarchy in its capitalist and socialist forms must be escaped in preparation for subjugated practices to emerge, with no guarantees that they will. Craig Willse and Dean Spade, editors of a recent special issue of Women & Performance on the film’s 30th anniversary, capture it perfectly: “instead of providing a pat narrative of a unified movement advocating for a single clear demand, Born in Flames leaves us with the unexploded bomb.”

Thanks to participants in the 24-day reading group on An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization that was part of the exhibition Local Time: Horotiu at St Paul Street Gallery, Auckland in April-May 2013.

Theses on art and knowledge

Published in un Magazine 7.1 http://unprojects.org.au/magazine/issues/issue-7-1/theses-on-art-and-knowledge/ 29th July 2013.

“Knowledge”, as described by educational institutions, is disciplinary knowledge. There is no way to know how much knowledge is held in an object of knowledge, (a report, for example) until one has done the work to understand how a field of knowledge is constructed. No report is self-authoring, containing all the knowledge needed to understand what is within. This knowledge-containing work needs other works. The visual arts are no different — and it may be a field where this idea is most evident. Scientific knowledge, including the more scientific classifying tendencies of modern art history, do not help us much when it comes to analysing of works of contemporary art. The stable conceptual frames that scientific innovation seeks to propose, stabilise, renovate, extend and consensually advance are largely absent. Even historical taxonomies of the avant-garde seem only made by the art historian to be broken by the artist. Works of contemporary art can only be engaged in the moment, where one gives oneself over to the work or moves with the work to some other place. To borrow a formulation from Irit Rogoff, the goal of the critical viewer is to singularise the work through the experience of the work. The scientific model of knowledge, by contrast, rests on an author who is ideally fully in control of their own work and its reception, adopting the immunity of objectivity. Dissemination will be a largely technical matter of reputation management, but the work itself is done and its purpose is never in doubt. In the creative arts such authors are boring, and therefore useless, except for academic justification. Art in the legacy of the avant-garde seeks instead invention, a Romantic desire to escape the pre-programming of the artist and artistic outputs. Lorraine Daston described the moral economy of modern scientific objectivity as emerging in late Protestant culture from a fear of idolatory, seduction, and projection by the gentlemanly researcher. These are exactly the scandalous means by which the creative artist makes their mark, and therefore their own contribution to knowledge that is shared with others. For this reason, importation of scientific or social scientific methods (shared and agreed propositional questions, consensually defined methods, falsifiable results) offers little to the artistic knowledge-creator except so far as it generates interest as opposed to disinterest. But any interest can only be invited, not compelled.

Works of art escape their constraints — whether set by curators, dealers, historians or, most critically, the artist themselves — in a future encounter with an audience. Art works have a certain ‘operationality.’ They work in the domain of Austin’s ‘performative acts’ — they make something happen directly in the meeting between work and viewer, in an unpredictable way. It is true that in light of institutional critique the audience is not some fully permeable and neutral entity, ready to respond to whatever the work creates. There are banal sociological and political-economic parameters that construct an audience for which the work can work. However, the work itself is never quite readable from these constraints. As deconstruction teaches us, knowing the rules of the game is not the same as knowing how to play. There is something child-like or childish about the relation of contemporary artists to the rules, but this is not a lack of seriousness – adults learn to forget that for the child play is completely serious, a way of crossing lines between the known and the unknown. The materiality of the aesthetic work can invite our interest precisely because it is a ‘boundary object’, combining sensations, concepts and affects that are both generically familiar and singularly unknowable. In a form of hybridisation, the art object draws us outside ourselves and into it, while we in turn ingest the aesthetic experience of the work. The ‘secret’ in the work is that which cannot be fully incorporated into ourselves or transmitted to another: the work is an index to the ‘multiplicity of realities’ that become a motor for further discovery: more looking, more listening, more learning, more work.

Since Alberti in the 15th century, this unique instability in visual arts production has been erratically theorised as a form of world-making that can be classed as writing in the broad sense. After Derrida, we can understand reading and writing as terms that can be used for the operation of sign and trace across all media: oral, alphabetic, audio-visual, biological,production and reproduction. Spivak defines writing as precisely “a place where the absence of the weaver from the web is structurally necessary.” It is a thing (whether alphabetic or audiovisual text) created for a reader who will take up that work at make it their own, perhaps even remaking themselves with the work. Therefore, despite the efforts of the protestant sciences to make an individual responsible for their own knowledge, a writer is inevitably dependent on a suitably prepared reader, and it is this other reader, not the writer, who can account for the knowledge-effects generated. Respect for the reader or viewer’s role in creating the scene of knowledge requires that the work be available for independent critical interpretation— a freedom and independence that since Kant has been essential to the operation of the aesthetic. It is here that we can understand a shared interest between viewers in the visual arts and readers in a humanities tradition. Exegetical writings that seek to explain or account for the artist’s activity in the scientific paradigm thus run counter to knowledge-production in the work except as far as they enhance or constitute the freedom and independence of the work. Explanatory writing by the artist may be useful in resisting the synchronisation of the art work to the art sales market, but at the expense of synchronising the artistic practice to the university market. The radical growth and rationalisation of university teaching of the creative disciplines may now make the art school market a larger and more important mechanism than the art sales market for capital to exert its torque on artists.

Keeping analysis close to home, the most important knowledge-making in the visual arts is precisely — ironically — a critique of these emerging constraints of artistic production: the research university’s knowledge-making practices. The archive of university knowledge is figured in the technoscientific paradigm as a smooth globe of knowledge to be “contributed to” by an appropriately defined research enquiry. An open-access database in the cloud. We know, however, that the idea of “knowledge in the world” through an expanded European university system is a contradictory historical tangle, resting on the material and political assumptions of colonial capitalism. This system was designed to bring a missionary “light” to the dark corners of the earth to make them safe for occupation and exploitation — these institutions of secular enlightenment have a Christian heritage not too far in their past, even as the sponsoring institution has changed from the state to the market. It is a culturally specific mode of knowledge which is being sustained even as the canon of university knowledge is globalised. There are many ways of knowing that exceed the narrow parameters of techno-scientific knowledge in a globally validated form that allow agency under capitalism. The visual arts perhaps collectively senses these constraints in the university, because the most influential criteria that delineate its own disciplinary boundaries have until very recently been held outside the university, in a quite different (though no less constraining) version of official culture expanded into a neoliberal market.

A lineage of conceptual artistic practice could take these questions of endemic forms of knowing to be the very basis of their contribution to knowledge. This may be an area where art can identify what epistemological presuppositions are at work within the kinds of knowledge validated in the scientific research paradigm more effectively than science can itself. At the birth of the modern scientific university in the early 19th century, the goal of knowledge was to expand to encompass the world, a powerful transformation of the theological call to forget our material limits in favour of universal principles. However, Heidegger recovered from Greek philosophy the idea that the ‘work of art’ initiated a world by creating a presence working in an oppositional direction to positivist knowledge. The experience of encountering work was not to take us into the future, but to prompt an experience of unconcealement or emplacement – to become more where one already was. Art can then help us remember a world outside ourselves, which capitalism would much rather have us forget in our chase to more efficiently improve what we already know. As artistic production is incorporated uneasily into the constraints of university knowledge, perhaps it becomes capable of pushing the future university to understand more deeply how to live on the planet we already inhabit, rather than one we produce in our own image.

Danny Butt <https://dannybutt.net> is Research Fellow at the Research Unit in Public Cultures, University of Melbourne. He is a member of the collective Local Time <http://www.local-time.net>